




© 2004 RICHARD S. MARKOVITS+
Since 1945, when Learned Hand asserted in Alcoa1 that Alcoa’s decision to preserve its 
market share by “doubling and redoubling its capacity” made its supposed2 possession of 
monopoly power illegal under the Sherman Act, American lawyers and economists have been 
aware of the related3 possibility that a business’ decision to grow internally by making one or 
more real investments4 may be independently illegal—in particular, may be predatory and hence 
violative of the Sherman Act’s prohibition of monopolizing or attempting to monopolize.5
However, neither the courts nor their legal and economic company have ever explicitly much 
less correctly defined the concept of a predatory investment.
This Article
(1) distinguishes  two types of investment, both of which may be predatory—
(A) what I call “quality-or-variety-increasing (QV) investments,” investments 
that are designed to increase the quality or variety of the products the 
investor offers for sale, to increase the quality or variety of the distributive 
outlets through which the investor sells its products, or to increase the 
average speed with which the investor delivers his products through a 
+ John B. Connally Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law.  B.A., Cornell University, 1963; 
Ph.D., London School of Economics, 1966; LL.B., Yale University, 1968; M.A., Oxford University, 1981.
1 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
2 Although the Alcoa court concluded that Alcoa did have monopoly power in the sense that it believed was 
of § 2 concern, it is not at all clear that Alcoa did have such power.  I should add that I do not think that possession 
of monopoly power is an element of the crime of monopolizing or attempting to monopolize.  See note 17 infra.
3 I say “related” because Hand never said that Alcoa’s investment decisions were illegal in themselves 
though he did use the word “exclusions” to describe the capacity-expansions on which he focused.  This 
characterization is significant because in antitrust-law jargon the statement that an act is “exclusionary” implies its 
illegality.
4 I am contrasting this choice with a choice to make a monetary investment in another company—to execute 
a total or partial acquisition of another business.





fluctuating-demand cycle (by increasing his capacity and/or inventory)
and
(B) what I call non-QV, cost-reducing investments in plant-modernization, 
new-plant construction, and production-process research (PPR)—research 
that is designed to discover an alternative production process for 
producing an existing product (an alternative process whose use would 
reduce average total cost, marginal cost, and/or accident and pollution 
costs),6
(2) defines the circumstances in which each of these types of investment can properly 
be said to be predatory,
(3) analyzes whether the courts that have heard predatory-investment cases and the 
economists who have attempted to define the concept “predatory investment” 
have defined this concept correctly either explicitly or implicitly in use, and
(4) discusses the structure, content, and practicability of different types of predatory-
investment suits.
The Article is divided into four parts.  Part I delineates the Sherman Act’s test of legality, 
defines the concept “predatory conduct,” and explains why all predatory conduct violates the 
Sherman Act’s test of legality.
Part II defines and elaborates on the concept of the “monopolistic investment incentive” 
an investor may have to make any type of investment and uses this concept to re-express the 
definition of the concept of a predatory investment.
Part III (1) delineates and explains examples of QV investments that respectively are and 
are not predatory, (2) criticizes the courts’ conclusions about the circumstances in which QV 
6 I recognize that an investor may sometimes choose to design and produce a new product that is both 
different from its predecessors and cheaper to produce than its predecessors.  Nothing I say turns on whether such an 
investment is classified as a QV investment.  I would be prone to classify as a non-QV, cost-reducing investment 
one that creates a new product whose customers value it less than they valued the rival products the relevant buyers 
originally purchased but whose cost of production was sufficiently lower than that of its predecessors to make the 
investment profitable.  I suppose I would classify as a mixed QV/non-QV, cost-reducing investment one that created 
a product that was both cheaper to produce than its predecessors and more valuable to its buyers than the products 
for which they could substitute it.  To repeat, however, nothing I say turns on these possibly-problematic 
classifications.  The text will focus on “pure” QV investments and “pure” non-QV investments in plant-
modernization, new-plant construction, and product-process research.  Investments that are mixed in the above sense 
can be predatory for the reason that pure QV investments can be predatory and/or for the reason that non-QV 
investments can be predatory.  Indeed, “pure” QV investments that reduce the marginal cost of production while 
increasing the average total cost of production can also be predatory not only for the reason the text indicates that 





investments will be predatory, (3) explains why the alternative definition of “a predatory (QV) 
investment” implicitly adopted by two highly respected economists7 is incorrect in the situation 
to which it was designed to apply—the situation in which the relevant QV investor believes ex 
ante that his investment will or may induce an established rival to withdraw an existing QV 
investment, fails to address the proper definition of a “predatory QV investment” in another, 
more-empirically-important situation in which QV investments may be predatory—situations in 
which the relevant QV investor believes ex ante that his investment will or may deter an actual 
or potential competitor from adding to total QV investment in the relevant area of product-space 
by making a new QV investment, and implies a definition of “predatory QV investments” that 
covers this latter situation that is also incorrect, and (4) discusses the evidence that would have to 
be adduced to prove or disprove the predatory character of a QV investment in a litigative 
context.
Part IV examines the circumstances in which the members of two sets of non-QV, cost-
reducing investment types will be predatory—(1) marginal-cost-reducing investments in plant-
modernization, new-plant construction, and production-process research (PPR) that is not 
designed to discover less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone production processes and (2) 
investments in PPR that are designed to discover less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone 
production processes.  Part IV also examines the structure of litigation about the predatory 
character of such non-QV, “cost-reducing” investments and the practicability of winning 
predation suits directed at such non-QV investments.
I. The Sherman Act’s Test of Legality, the Proper Definition of “Predatory” Conduct, and 
the Legality of Predatory Conduct Under the Sherman Act
Many academic lawyers—particularly those who know some economics8—and many 
economists who have written about antitrust law9 proceed on the assumption that the American 
7 See Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product 
Innovation, 91 YALE L. J. 8, 9, 13, 24, 41 (1981).
8 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981), 
Robert Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978), and Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested 
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
9 See, e.g., Paul Joskow and Alvin Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 




antitrust laws authorize the courts to regulate the conduct and practices the laws cover in the 
public interest, which the relevant scholars tend to equate with regulating the relevant conduct in 
the way that increases economic efficiency to the greatest extent possible.10  I disagree.  In my 
judgment, a proper reading of the two leading American antitrust statutes (the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts11)—a reading that takes account of their text, their legal antecedents, the social 
histories that preceded their enactment, their legislative histories, and the overall structure of the 
legal regime in which they play a part12—reveals that neither promulgates an economic-
efficiency test of legality.
Since the antitrust legality of the investments with which this Article is concerned is 
determined by the Sherman Act, I will focus here exclusively on the test of legality the Sherman 
Act should be interpreted to promulgate.  The Sherman Act has two basic provisions.  Section 1 
prohibits “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several states, or with foreign nations,” and Section 2 makes it illegal for anyone to 
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire...to monopolize” any part of 
interstate or foreign commerce.  In my opinion, correctly interpreted, these two provisions of the 
Sherman Act would be read to prohibit any13 business act or practice whose profitability was 
10 In fact, many of the relevant scholars seem to assume (incorrectly) that there is no difference between the 
judicial rulings that would increase competition (in some ill-defined sense) to the greatest extent possible, benefit 
consumers to the greatest extent possible, and increase economic efficiency to the greatest extent possible.  For a 
discussion of the differences among these three objectives and the reasons why judicial decisions that secure one of 
them to the greatest possible extent are unlikely to achieve the others to the greatest possible extent, see Richard S. 
Markovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. 
REV. 567, 580 (1979).
11 See the Sherman Antitrust Act, op. cit. supra note 5 and the Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27 [1994]).  The text ignores the third major American antitrust statute—
the Federal Trade Commission Act—because it has almost always been assumed to have promulgated the same tests 
of legality as the Sherman and Clayton Acts.  See Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A §§ 41-58 [1994]). (Admittedly, the Supreme Court has indicated that behavior that violates 
neither the Sherman nor the Clayton Antitrust Act may still violate the Federal Trade Commission Act.  However, 
the Court has never produced an example of behavior that would violate the FTC Act without violating the Sherman 
or Clayton Act.)
12 For a detailed discussion of the respective American antitrust laws’ tests of legality, see Richard S. 
Markovits, Some Preliminary Notes on the American Antitrust Laws’ Economic Tests of Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
891 (1975).
13 The coverage of the two basic provisions of the Sherman Act is very broad.  In fact, the only kind of 




perceived by its perpetrators ex ante to be “ceteris paribus critically increased” by (in reality, 
ceteris paribus critically inflated by)14 its tendency to increase the demand curve the relevant 
actor(s) faced or would face by reducing the absolute attractiveness of the offers against which 
the actor(s) must compete.
Obviously, the expression “ceteris paribus critically inflated” needs to be explicated.  In
my terminology, the private profits yielded by a choice are said to be “inflated” if they exceed 
the economic or allocative efficiency15 of the choice in question; the private profits of a choice 
are said to be “critically inflated” if the choice is privately profitable despite the fact that it is 
allocatively inefficient; and the private profits of a choice are said to be “ceteris paribus
reflects the fact that, unlike § 2, § 1 does not explicitly cover attempts, the Sherman Act is in part a criminal statute, 
the central government of the United States has never passed a general criminal attempt statute (which would 
prohibit attempting to do anything that would be illegal to succeed in doing), and the federal courts have always 
refused to read attempt provisions into criminal statutes that do not contain them even when their omission was 
clearly a drafting error.  In my experience, antitrust lawyers believe that the courts would and should hold that 
unsuccessful attempts to enter into anti-competitive agreements violate § 2’s prohibition of attempts to monopolize 
while criminal lawyers believe that the courts would never and should never reach such a conclusion—would hold 
that the Sherman Act does  not prohibit unsuccessful attempts to enter into anti-competitive agreements.
14 I have used the word “increased” and added the parenthetical to indicate that an investor’s QV investment 
can be predatory without his consciously focusing on the fact that its profitability was critically inflated (on the fact 
that a critical amount of the profits he anticipated it would yield him by increasing his other projects’ profit-yields 
would have no allocative-efficiency-gain counterparts).  All that is required is that the investor’s ex ante conclusion 
that his investment was ex ante at least normally profitable be critically affected by his perception that it might 
increase his other products’ profit-yields in one or more of the five ways listed in the text that are distorting 
(regardless of whether he focuses on the fact that the profits in question are distorted).  In one sense, the law could 
be said to condemn his act and him because what he did know should have led him to realize that he was making an 
inherently unprofitable and therefore presumptively economically inefficient choice because of the purely private 
strategic benefits it gave him.
15 The text that follows substitutes the term “allocative efficiency” for the conventional “economic efficiency” 
to remind readers that the concept is technical and that the fact that a choice increases allocative efficiency is neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for either its consistency with our rights-commitments or its overall 
desirability if it is neither required by nor prohibited by our rights-commitments.  These conclusions reflect the fact 
that the statement that a choice increases allocative efficiency implies only (1) that it makes somebody better off 
without making anyone worse off—if the expression “increasing allocative efficiency” is defined in a non-
monetized and useless way—or (2) that it gives its beneficiaries the equivalent of more dollars than it takes away 
from its victims—if the expression is defined in the monetized way in which economists actually use it.  See 
Richard S. Markovits, On the Relevance of Economic Efficiency Conclusions, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1 (2002) and A 
Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of “the Effect of a Choice on Allocative 
(Economic) Efficiency”: What Is Right and Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-
and-Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong (henceforth Constructive Critique) 1993 ILL. L. REV. 485 (1993).
I should add that, in my terminology, the profits yielded by a choice are said to be “deflated” if they are 
lower than the allocative efficiency of that choice.  This “distortion,” “inflation,” “deflation” terminology is applied 
not only to the profits yielded by a choice but also to the private costs and benefits yielded by a choice.  In 
particular, the private costs or private benefits of a choice are said to be distorted, inflated, or deflated if they 




critically inflated” by one of its effects or tendencies (or by one or more Pareto imperfections) if 
the effect or tendency (or imperfection[s] in question) would critically inflate the private profits 
of the choice in question if nothing else “distorted” those profits—i.e., if nothing else caused 
them to diverge from the choice’s allocative efficiency (for example, if the economy were 
otherwise-Pareto-perfect).16
Now that I have defined the Sherman Act’s test of legality,17 I can define the general 
concept of predatory conduct and reach some general conclusions about the Sherman-Act 
legality of conduct that is properly deemed predatory.  Since I anticipate that some readers will 
object to the idea of a “proper definition” of a concept, I should state at the outset that my belief 
in the correctness of the following definition of “predatory conduct” is based on its consistency
both with the way in which the concept has been used in the economics and legal literature and 
with predatory conduct’s pejorative or sinister connotation.  In any event, in my judgment, 
business conduct is properly said to be predatory if its profitability is ceteris paribus critically 
inflated by its tendency to reduce the absolute attractiveness of the offers against which the 
alleged predator  has (predators have) to compete by driving an established rival out of part or all 
of its business, by inducing an established rival to relocate its QV investments farther away from 
those of the alleged predator’s projects, by deterring the entry of a potential competitor or the 
QV-investment expansion of an established rival, or by inducing an entering potential competitor 
or expanding established rival to locate its new QV investment farther away in product-space 
from the predator's projects than that investor would otherwise have found profitable.
16 For an analysis of the ways in which Pareto imperfections—imperfections in seller competition, 
imperfections in buyer competition, externalities, taxes on the margin of income, chooser non-sovereignty, chooser 
non-maximization, and critically distorting buyer surplus—will cause allocative inefficiency of various types, see 
Richard S. Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A Checklist for 
Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1976).
17 Somewhat surprisingly and highly regrettably, the federal courts have never explicitly defined the test of 
legality they believe the Sherman Act promulgates.  However, by and large, the test I associate with the Act is 
consistent with the relevant judicial decisions.  Nevertheless, I must admit that there are two significant exceptions 
to the preceding claim.  First, the courts assert that the Sherman Act promulgates an objective test of legality (which 
focuses on the actual or objectively predictable effects of conduct) rather than the subjective test I have articulated 
(which focuses on the actor’s or actors’ ex ante perceptions of the effects of the relevant conduct).  Second, the 
courts claim that a defendant’s conduct cannot violate § 2 of the Sherman Act unless (1) the defendant possessed 
monopoly power prior to committing the allegedly illegal act in question and (2) its commission of the relevant act 




It may be useful to explain why the conduct I have defined to be predatory deserves to be 
condemned.  In particular, business conduct that satisfies my definition of “predatory” should be 
condemned because it is maldistributive, ceteris paribus misallocative, and badly motivated.  
Such conduct is maldistributive because it injures innocent parties and benefits wrongdoers.  The 
relevant innocent victims are the predator's target, who sustains a loss not attributable to its 
absolute or relative allocative inefficiency, and the predator's customers, who will lose more in 
the long run when the predation reduces the competition their best-placed suppliers face than 
they will gain in the short run from any price-reduction or other improvement in terms the 
predatory act entails.  The relevant wrongdoer is the predator, who profits by committing acts 
that are both presumptively misallocative in the short run (because they are, by definition, 
inherently unprofitable [unprofitable but for the strategic advantages they generate]) and ceteris 
paribus misallocative in the long run as well to the extent that they are successful (because the 
reductions in QV-investment competition18 and price competition they will generate in the long 
run if they are successful will be misallocative on balance).  As the preceding sentence indicated, 
predation also tends to be undesirable because it is misallocative on balance in both the short run 
and the long run.  Indeed, although space-constraints preclude me from demonstrating this point, 
an analysis that took appropriate account of the other relevant imperfections that are present in 
the system would reveal that the tendency that predation has to reduce competition in the long 
run is misallocative not only on the otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumptions that play a role in 
predatory conduct’s definition but also on realistic assumptions about the Pareto-imperfectness 
of our economy.19  Finally, predatory conduct is ill-motivated because, as I have just argued, it is 
presumptively-economically-inefficient conduct in which the predator would not have engaged 
18 In my terminology, the concept “QV-investment competition” refers to the process in which the owners of 
QV investments in some (arbitrarily designated) area of product-space compete away the supernormal profits their 
QV investments in that area would otherwise yield by introducing additional QV investments into that area of 
product-space that raise the equilibrium level of QV investment in that area of product-space.  The preceding 
sentence and my work in general do not refer to markets because I do not think that markets can be defined non-
arbitrarily.  See Richard S. Markovits, On the Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions, 2002 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 571 (2002).
19 See Richard S. Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A 
Checklist of Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1976) and The Allocative Efficiency and Overall 




but for his belief that it would enable him to secure purely private gains that would come at the 
expense of innocent rivals and buyers.
The illegality of predatory conduct under the Sherman Act should be apparent from the 
preceding articulation of the Sherman Act’s test of legality and definition of the concept of 
predatory conduct.  Predatory conduct could be described as one of the two types of conduct that 
can violate the Sherman Act.  More specifically, (non-predatory) price fixing or its equivalents 
may20 or will violate the Sherman Act because a price fixer’s ex ante perception that the conduct 
in question will generate at least normal profits is critically affected by its belief that the relevant 
conduct may reduce the absolute attractiveness of the offers against which the price fixer must 
compete by inducing its rivals to offer buyers objectively-less- attractive terms on their existing 
products.  Conduct that is properly called predatory will violate the Sherman Act because its 
perpetrator’s perception that it is ex ante profitable is critically affected by a belief that the 
conduct may increase the perpetrator’s profits by reducing the absolute attractiveness of the 
offers against which it will have to compete by inducing an established rival to withdraw or 
relocate a QV investment that was already established in the relevant area of product-space, 
inducing an established rival to forego making or to relocate its new QV investment in the 
predator’s area of product-space, or inducing a potential competitor to forego executing or to 
change the location of a new entry into the predator’s area of product-space.
II. The Concept of a “Monopolistic Investment Incentive” and the Definition of a “Predatory 
Investment”
My concept of a “monopolistic investment incentive” plays a crucial role in the 
operational definition of the concept “predatory investment.”  In my terminology, an investor is 
said to have a monopolistic investment incentive to make a QV investment (a non-QV, cost-
reducing investment) when and to the extent that he believes ex ante that the investment in 
question will increase the profit-yields of his other QV investments (his QV investments) not 
necessarily in comparison with the status quo ante but in comparison with the situation that 
would prevail if the investor had not made the investment in question in ways that do not suggest 





that the QV (cost-reducing) investment in question will be more allocatively efficient than it 
otherwise would have been.  Hence, the fact that an investor believes ex ante that he has a 
monopolistic investment incentive to make a particular investment implies that he believes ex 
ante that the private profits that the investment in question will yield will be ceteris paribus
inflated—more specifically, that, ceteris paribus, the private profits the investment in question
will yield will exceed the amount by which it will increase allocative efficiency by at least as 
much as the operative monopolistic investment incentive.21
When the investment that he should conclude that he has a monopolistic investment 
incentive to make is a QV investment, I call the relevant incentive a “monopolistic QV-
investment incentive.”  When the investment that the investor believes he has a monopolistic 
incentive to make is a cost-reducing investment, I call the relevant incentive a “monopolistic 
cost-reducing-investment incentive.”
Before proceeding to offer an operational definition of the concept “predatory 
investment” that incorporates the notion of a monopolistic investment incentive, I want to make 
five points about the concept “monopolistic investment incentive.”  The first relates specifically 
to monopolistic QV-investment incentives.  The fact that an investor believes that a particular 
QV investment will increase the profit-yields of the investor’s other QV investments is not a 
sufficient condition for the investor’s believing that he has a monopolistic QV-investment 
incentive to make the QV investment in question.  Thus, the fact that a QV investor believes ex 
ante that a particular QV investment will increase his other QV investments’ profit-yields by 
enabling him to take advantage of cost-related economies of scale in production, distribution, or 
finance will not imply that he should conclude that he has a monopolistic investment incentive to 
make the investment in question since the fact that the relevant cost-savings are presumptively 
allocative as well as private (that the allocative cost-savings would equal their private 
counterparts in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy) implies that the additional profits the 
investor obtains on this account will not inflate the private profits yielded by the QV investment 
21 In this Article, I am defining the monopolistic investment incentive a firm has to make a particular QV or 
cost-reducing investment by the absolute amount by which the incentive increases the investment’s profit-yield.  
This definition differs from the definition I usually employ.  In other works, I have defined the monopolistic QV-
investment incentive a firm has to make a particular QV investment by the absolute increase it yields in the rate of 
return the investment in question generates.  For an explanation of the “at least as much” language of the footnoted 




in question—i.e., will not cause the total private profits it yields to exceed its contribution to 
allocative efficiency.  For the same reason, the fact that a QV investor believes ex ante that a 
particular QV investment will increase the profit-yields of his other QV investments by 
increasing the equivalent-dollar value to relevant buyers of the other products or services he 
supplies by linking his brand name to a superior product whose existence increases the reputation 
of his other products, by changing the image of his product-line (perhaps by changing the 
attributes of his customers) in ways that increase the demand for his other products, or by 
enabling him to supply a full line to final buyers who prefer purchasing complete sets for 
aesthetic reasons, to final buyers or distributors who wish to take advantage of “economies of 
scale” in learning about particular products they might purchase or distribute, or to final buyers 
or distributors who wish to take advantage of “economies of scale” in learning how to use, 
learning how to sell, or selling particular product-variants does not imply on our otherwise-
Pareto-perfect assumption that the investor should conclude ex ante that he has a monopolistic 
investment incentive to make the QV investment in question.
The second point relates both to monopolistic QV-investment incentives and to 
monopolistic cost-reducing-investment incentives.  Investors will have a monopolistic incentive 
to make a QV investment or a cost-reducing investment only if the investment in question
induces a rival to withdraw a QV investment, deters a rival from introducing a new QV 
investment that will increase total QV investment in the relevant area of product-space, and/or 
induces a rival to change the location of an existing or future QV investment in the relevant area 
of product-space.  Both QV investments and various types of cost-reducing investments can 
induce all these types of rival QV-investment responses.  A QV investment X1 can do so 
because its presence can reduce the number of customers that the owner of an existing or future 
rival QV investment X2 would be privately-best-placed to supply via X2 or the size of the 
competitive advantages the owner of an existing or rival QV investment X2 would have in 
relation to customers that his ownership of X2 made him or would make him privately-best-
placed to supply.22  A cost-reducing investment that reduced the marginal cost that its maker had 
22 In my terminology, a seller is privately-best-placed to supply a particular buyer if the seller could profit by 
supplying that buyer on terms that would preclude any other rival from making an inherently profitable sale to the 
buyer in question.  The basic “competitive advantage” that a supplier enjoys in his relations with a particular buyer 
he is privately-best-placed to supply equals the amount by which the buyer prefers his product variant to that of his 




to incur to supply the product or service his QV investment X1 created can induce these types of 
rival QV-investment responses because—by reducing its maker’s marginal costs—it will reduce 
the profits that some of his rivals would be able to realize by making use of their existing or 
particular possible future QV investments X2 by reducing the frequency with which and average 
amount by which those rival QV investments X2 would make their owner best-placed to supply 
particular buyers.  And in appropriate circumstances an actor’s investment in production-process 
research that might discover a less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone production process that 
was otherwise more expensive to use could produce the relevant rival QV-investment responses 
by reducing the profits that rivals could realize by using particular existing or possible future QV 
investments by making them liable for some of the accident or pollution costs generated by their 
production of the products or operation of the distributive outlets these QV investments created 
or would create for which they would not otherwise have been liable—i.e., in negligence 
jurisdictions, by making it negligent for them to generate those costs because they have not 
chosen to use the discovered, less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone production process (by 
putting them in a position in which they must pay a license fee to use the discovered, otherwise-
more-expensive production process, make an otherwise unprofitable shift to the production of an 
alternative product-variant that they could produce without using the discovered process without 
being negligent on that account, make an otherwise-unprofitable shift to a less-accident-and-
pollution-cost-prone location at which their rejection of the discovered process would not be 
negligent, withdraw or not make the QV investment in question, or pay damages equal to the 
accident and pollution costs they generated because they continued to produce their original 
product at their original location with their original production process).
The third point is that the ex ante belief of a QV investor or cost-reducing investor that 
his QV investment or cost-reducing investment may induce one or more of the investor’s rivals 
to withdraw an existing QV investment, may deter one or more such firms from making a new 
QV investment, and/or may induce one or more such firms to relocate an existing or future QV 
investment should lead him to conclude that his investment will increase the profit-yields of his 
other QV investments (if the investment to be characterized is a QV investment) or his QV 
that buyer’s patronage exceeds the marginal (incremental) cost the best-placed seller would have to incur to supply 





investments (if the investment in question is a cost-reducing investment) for one of more of at 
least the following seven reasons:
(1) in instances in which the investment in question is a QV investment that the 
investor believes may induce an established rival to withdraw an existing QV 
investment or deter an established or potential rival from introducing a new QV 
investment into the relevant area of product-space, because the rival QV 
investment the QV investment in question causes to be withdrawn or deters from 
being made reduced or would reduce the competitive advantages the QV investor 
has when selling his other products or operating his other outlets in part because 
the QV investment he made will be farther in product-space from the investor’s
other QV investments than the rival QV investment it would eliminate was or it 
would deter would be and in part because the QV investor will not subject his old 
QV investments to competition from his new QV investment when his new 
investment is worse-placed than his old investment to obtain the patronage of a 
particular buyer,
(2) in instances in which the QV investment in question is a cost-reducing investment 
and the investor believes that it may induce the withdrawal of an existing, rival 
QV investment or deter a rival from making a new QV investment in 
circumstances in which the withdrawn or deterred rival QV investment will not be 
replaced, because the investor will believe that the withdrawn (deterred) QV 
investment reduced (would reduce) the competitive advantages he enjoyed when 
marketing the products or operating the outlets created by his QV investments,
(3) in instances in which (A) the investment in question is a QV investment made by 
an investor who believes that it will replace the existing, rival QV investment it 
will cause to be withdrawn or the future rival QV investment it will deter and (B)
the products or distributive services the relevant QV investments create are priced 
on an across-the-board-basis (are sold at a price that applies to all their potential 
purchasers), because the investor will believe that the QV-investment 
“substitution” in question will increase the prices that he (and his rivals) can
obtain non-oligopolistically23 by eliminating a rival that announced its prices later 
23 In my vocabulary, the highest non-oligopolistic price a firm can charge is the price it would find most 
profitable to charge if it knew that its rivals knew that it could not react to their responses to its initial price.  For an 
elaboration and discussion of the determinants if (1) the height of a privately-best-placed seller’s highest non-
oligopolistic price to an individual buyer and (2) the height of the array of highest non-oligopolistic prices that a set 
of across-the-board-pricing rivals could charge, see Richard S. Markovits, Oligopolistic Price and Oligopolistic 
Pricing: Their Conventional and Operational Definition, 26 STAN. L. REV. 493 (1974).  The definition of 
“oligopolistic pricing” that the above definition implies is not standard in the economics literature.  Economists have 
never explicitly defined “oligopolistic pricing”—i.e., have defined the concept only implicitly in use by labeling 
various pricing models “oligopolistic.”  Although many of the pricing models that economists denominate 
“oligopolistic” are oligopolistic in my sense—i.e., do involve moves whose actor-perceived profitability depends on 
the actor’s belief that his rivals responses will be affected by their realization that he can react to their responses, 
other pricing models that economists label “oligopolistic” do not involve the above kind of complex, two-step 
interdependence—i.e., involve nothing more than an actor’s realization that the pay-off to his move will be affected 




in the order of price announcements than would be in the joint interest of all the 
relevant sellers,24
(4) in instances in which (A) the investment in question is a cost-reducing investment 
made by an investor who believes that it may induce the withdrawal of an existing 
QV investment that will not be replaced and (B) the relevant products or 
distributive services are priced on an across-the-board basis, because the relevant 
investor will believe that his QV investment will eliminate a rival whose late 
pricing reduced the prices the relevant investor (and his rivals) could obtain non-
oligopolistically (an outcome that will be most likely when the eliminated rival 
was privately-best-placed less often than it was slightly worse than privately-best-
placed),
(5) in instances in which the investment in question is a QV investment made by an 
investor who believes that it may induce the withdrawal of an existing, rival QV 
investment or deter the introduction of a new, rival QV investment or in instances 
in which the investment in question is a cost-reducing investment made by an 
investor who believes that its introduction will reduce equilibrium QV investment 
in the relevant area of product-space or lead to a change in the identity of the 
owners of an unaffected volume of QV investment in the relevant area of product-
space, because the investor will expect that on those accounts the investment will 
tend to increase the amount of oligopolistic margins he can secure (say, by 
reducing the number of independent sellers in the relevant area of product-space 
that are second-placed or close-to-second-placed to supply his customers or by 
eliminating or preventing the entry of a rival whose presence would be unusually 
inimical to oligopolistic pricing of any kind),
(6) in instances in which the investment in question is either a QV investment or a 
cost-reducing investment and the investor believes that it will induce a rival to 
relocate an existing QV investment or locate a new QV investment in the relevant 
area of product-space farther away from the investor’s other QV investments than 
would otherwise have been the case, because the investor will perceive that the 
investment will increase the competitive advantages he enjoys when selling the 
products or distributive services his (other) QV investments create and/or will 
increase the oligopolistic margins he can secure when selling these products or 
distributive services (say, by reducing the number of rivals who would find it 
inherently profitable to beat some oligopolistic price he would otherwise have 
found profitable to charge), and
24 For an explanation of why the height of the set of highest non-oligopolistic prices that could be charged by 





(7) in instances in which the investment in question is either a QV investment or a 
cost-reducing investment and the investor believes that it may replace an existing 
or future rival QV investment, deter a rival QV investment that would have raised 
total QV investment in the relevant area of product-space, and/or induced a rival 
to change the location of an existing or future QV investment, because the 
investor believes that in these ways the investment will reduce the profits his 
(other) QV investments lose because of retaliatory acts his rivals commit—
because the amount by which he believes the profit-yields of his (other) QV 
investments will be reduced by retaliation against the investment in question, his 
use of that investment, and any rival-QV-investment location-shifts it engenders 
is lower than the amount by which he believes the profit-yields of his (other) QV 
investments would otherwise have been reduced by retaliation against the 
operation of the rival QV investments the relevant investment will induce to be 
withdrawn, the execution of the rival QV investments the relevant investment 
would deter, and/or the operation of the rival QV investments the relevant 
investment will deter.
The fourth point is that any time that an investor believes that his investment will 
increase the profit-yields of his (other) QV investments by eliciting one or more of the rival QV-
investment responses described above he should believe on that account that he has a 
monopolistic investment incentive to make the investment in question (that the profitability of 
his investment will be inflated on that account).  This conclusion reflects the fact that none of the 
ways in which such rival QV-investment responses will increase the investor’s (other) QV 
investments’ profit-yields suggests  that on their account the investor’s investment will be more 
allocatively efficient than it otherwise would have been.  Thus, although the fact that an 
investor’s QV investment is farther away in product-space from his other QV investments than 
was the rival QV investment that the investment in question causes to be withdrawn or than the 
rival QV investment the relevant investment deters from being executed would have been does 
imply that the QV investment in question will increase the investor’s other QV investments’ 
profit-yields, it has no implications for the allocative efficiency of the relevant QV investment 
relative to that of the QV investment it replaces: after all, the fact that the QV investment in 
question is farther away from the investor’s other QV investments implies that it must be closer 
to (more “duplicative” of) the QV investments of the investor’s rivals.  Similarly, although the 
fact that a QV investor will not use his new QV investment to compete against his old QV 
investments does increase the amount by which the new QV investment will raise the profits 




investment.  Again, the fact that a cost-reducing investment will reduce the volume of rival QV 
investments against which the investor’s QV investments have to compete will tend to increase
their profit-yields, at least on otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumptions it will not suggest that the 
relevant cost-reducing investment is more allocatively efficient than it otherwise would have 
been.  In the same vein, since there is no reason to believe that any tendency of an investor’s QV
or cost-reducing investment to induce the investor’s actual and potential competitors to relocate 
their QV investments farther from his (other) QV investments will increase the allocative 
efficiency of his rivals’ QV investments, the contribution that any such tendency of the 
investment to be characterized makes to the profit-yields of the investor’s (other) QV 
investments will inflate its profitability.  The same conclusion will obtain a fortiori for the other 
ways in which a relevant investment can increase the profit-yields of the investor’s other QV 
investments: since all these ways involve the relevant investment’s increasing the prices that the 
investor can obtain for his other products and many involve its increasing the prices that the 
investor’s remaining (non-PPR) rivals can obtain for their products, the associated increase in the 
profit-yields of the investor’s (other) QV investments that these possibilities entail will be 
generated by effects that make the investment’s consequences less allocatively efficient than they 
otherwise would have been.25  In these cases, the inflation of the private profits of the investment 
in question will be larger than the monopolistic investment incentive the investor had to execute 
it—will equal the sum of that incentive and the amount of misallocation it caused by producing 
the effects that made it more profitable than allocatively efficient.
The fifth and final point relates to why I have called the QV-investment incentives and
cost-reducing-investment incentives just delineated monopolistic investment disincentives.  In 
brief, I have done so because no investor who sells any product he produces in a perfectly-
competitive situation will ever have such an incentive and because, ceteris paribus, the size of 
any such incentive an investor has will (roughly speaking) tend to increase with the percentage
25 Even in our highly-Pareto-imperfect economy, decreases in price competition will tend to cause allocative 
inefficiency both in many different ways and on balance—e.g., by increasing the extent of misallocation caused by 
labor-leisure decisions, production-process-research decisions, decisions to create more quality and variety.  See 
Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A Critique 
of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON LEG. 63 





he owns of the QV investment in the area of product-space in which the QV investments whose 
profit-yields are increased are located.
I will now delineate an operational definition of “a predatory investment” that makes use 
of the concept monopolistic investment incentive.  According to this definition, an investment is 
properly said to be predatory if and only if the investor perceived its ex ante profitability to be 
ceteris paribus critically increased (and hence ceteris paribus critically inflated) by the 
monopolistic investment incentive he had to make the investment.  This definition of “a 
predatory investment” fits the general definition for predation because it deems an investment 
predatory if and only if
(1) the relevant investor would not have found it ex ante profitable (worth making) 
but for its tendency to reduce the attractiveness of the offers against which his
(other) QV investments have to compete (a fact that implies that the investment in 
question would be allocatively inefficient in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy 
even if it would not misallocate resources by reducing competition in the long 
run) and
(2) the investor believed that the investment was rendered ex ante profitable all things 
considered by its tendency to increase the profits of the investor’s (other) QV 
investments by reducing the absolute attractiveness of the rival offers against 
which they had to compete (a tendency that in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect 
economy would if anything further reduce the relevant investment’s allocative 
efficiency).
III. Predatory QV Investments
Quality-or-variety-increasing (QV) investments may be predatory both (1) when they are 
made by an investor who believes ex ante that they may deter an actual or potential competitor to 
forego adding a new QV investment to the relevant area of product-space that will increase total 
QV investment in that space, induce such an actual or potential competitor to change the location 
of the additional QV investment it makes in the relevant area of product-space, and/or induce an 
established rival to change the location of an existing QV investment and (2) when they are made 
by an investor who believes ex ante that they may cause an established rival of the investor to 
withdraw an existing QV investment.  Unfortunately from the perspective of those who like 
antitrust analysis to be simple,26 QV investments can also not be predatory in both these 
26 For a critique of the claim that it would be both (1) legally valid and legitimate and (2) desirable from a 




situations.  Part III.A provides examples of predatory and non-predatory QV investments made 
by investors who have each of the preceding beliefs.  Part III.B comments on
(1) the courts’ apparent belief that investments that would not be profitable unless
they induced the withdrawal of an established investment will not violate the 
Sherman Act unless the investor conducts the relevant fight to the death unfairly 
by engaging in concrete acts that place its opponent at a competitive disadvantage 
that does not reflect the rival’s allocative-efficiency inferiority and
(2) the predatory character of the Alcoa investment in capacity that Judge Learned 
Hand concluded would make any monopoly power Alcoa possessed illegal under 
the Sherman Act.
Part III.C delineates and criticizes Ordover and Willig’s implicit definition of “predatory QV 
investment.” And Part III.D discusses the evidence that would have to be adduced to 
demonstrate that a particular QV investment was and was not predatory and discusses the 
difficulties of discovering such evidence in a litigative context.
A. Some Examples of QV Investments That Are and Are Not Predatory
Part III.A provides and explains examples of QV investments that are and are not 
predatory.  Because of the way in which the literature has developed, it focuses separately on 
situations in which the QV investor believes ex ante that (1) his QV investment may deter an 
established rival or potential competitor from introducing an additional QV investment that will 
increase total QV investment in the relevant area of product-space, may induce an established or 
potential competitor to change the location of a future QV investment that will increase total QV 
investment in the relevant area of product-space, or may induce an established competitor to 
change the location of an existing QV investment in the relevant area of product space and (2) 
his investment may induce an established rival of the QV investor to withdraw an existing QV 
investment from the relevant area of product-space.
Part III.A also illustrates the difference between (1) a predatory QV investment properly 
so-called and (2) a QV investment made by an investor who would not have found it (normally) 
profitable ex ante but for his belief that it might lead a rival to withdraw an existing QV 
investment from the relevant area of product-space, deter one or more established or potential 
Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41 (1984), criticizing then-professor and now-Judge Frank Easterbrook’s 




competitors from making an additional QV investment that would increase total QV investment 
in the relevant area of product-space, and/or induce an established or potential competitor of the 
investor to alter the product-space location of an existing or future QV investment in the relevant 
area of product-space.  In the text that follows, the latter types of QV investments are called 
“limit investments.”  In contexts in which the QV investor believes ex ante that his investment 
may deter his established or potential rivals from adding a new QV investment to the relevant 
area of product-space, the expression “limit investments” builds on the well-established 
economic expression “limit pricing,” which refers to the practice in which established sellers 
charge a lower price than they would otherwise perceive to be profitable to deter new entry.27
Admittedly, it is something of a stretch to extend the definition of the concept “limit investment” 
to cover not only (1) investments that would not have been perceived by their maker to be ex 
ante profitable but for his perception that they may deter a new entry or an established-rival QV-
investment expansion but also (2) investments that would not have been perceived by their 
maker to be ex ante profitable but for his perception that they may induce an established rival to 
withdraw an existing QV investment from the relevant area of product-space or a fortiori induce 
an established or potential competitor to change the product-space location of an existing or 
future QV investment.  However, for convenience, I will define the concept “limit investment” to 
cover all these possibilities.  In particular, I have adopted this usage because it enables me to 
express my criticism of Ordover and Willig’s analysis of predatory QV investments both in the 
context in which they analyzed this issue—namely, when the investment in question would lead
to the withdrawal of an existing QV investment—and in the context that they ignored—namely, 
when the investment to be characterized would deter someone else from making a new QV 
investment in the relevant area of product-space or lead a rival of the investor to change the 
location of an existing or future QV investment—in the following way: Ordover and Willig have 
conflated “predatory QV investments” with “limit (QV) investments.”
27 The standard reference for “limit pricing” theory is JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).  
For an argument that claims that limit pricing will rarely deter entry, will rarely be profitable even if it would deter 
entry, will virtually always be less profitable than other methods of deterring entry (such as limited investing) even 
if it is more profitable than allowing entry to occur, and will rarely if ever be practiced, see Richard S. Markovits, 
Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the 




1. Some Examples of Non-Predatory/Non-Limit QV Investments, Non-Predatory/Limit QV 
Investments, and Predatory/Limit QV Investments Made by an Investor Who Believed Ex 
Ante That They Might Deter an Established or Potential Competitor From Making an 
Additional QV Investment, Induce a Rival to Change the Product-Space Location of a 





CHART I: SOME EXAMPLES OF QV INVESTMENTS MADE BY AN INVESTOR WHO BELIEVES 
THAT THEY WILL DETER AN ESTABLISHED OR POTENTIAL COMPETITOR FROM MAKING AN 
ADDITIONAL QV INVESTMENT BUT WILL NOT INDUCE AN ESTABLISHED RIVAL TO 
WITHDRAW AN EXISTING QV INVESTMENT OR AN ESTABLISHED OR POTENTIAL RIVAL TO 
CHANGE THE LOCATION OF AN EXISTING OR FUTURE QV INVESTMENT THAT WILL BE 
NON-PREDATORY/NON-LIMIT QV INVESTMENTS, NON-PREDATORY/LIMIT QV 







COL/ROW INVESTOR QV-INVESTMENT 
PROFIT-EXPECTATIONS
IA IB IIA IIB











YIELDS OF INVESTOR’S 
OTHER PROJECTS
$150 $150 $110 $110 $ 90
(3) AMOUNT BY WHICH THE 
INVESTOR EXPECTS THE QV 
TO REDUCE HIS OTHER QVS’ 
PROFIT-YIELDS IN 
COMPARISON WITH THE 
STATUS QUO ANTE—THE 
MONOPOLISTIC QV-
INVESTMENT DISINCENTIVE 
THE INVESTOR WOULD 
PERCEIVE THAT HE FACED IF 
HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT 
THE QV WOULD DETER A 
RIVAL QV
$ 30 $ 30 $ 30 $ 30 $ 30
(4) PROFITS THE INVESTOR 
WOULD EXPECT THE QV TO
YIELD IF IT WOULD NOT 
DETER A RIVAL QV
$120 $120 $ 80 $ 80 $ 60
(5) AMOUNT BY WHICH THE 
INVESTOR BELIEVES THE QV 
THE RELEVANT QV WILL 
DETER WOULD REDUCE THE 
INVESTOR’S OTHER QVS’ 
PROFIT-YIELDS IN 
COMPARISON WITH THE 
STATUS QUO ANTE
$ 20 $ 40 $ 20 $ 40 $ 50
(6) QV INVESTOR’S PERCEIVED 
MONOPOLISTIC QV-
INVESTMENT INCENTIVE
-$ 10 +$ 10 -$ 10 +$ 10 +$ 20
(7) ACTUAL PROFITS THE 
INVESTOR EXPECTS THE 
RELEVANT QV TO YIELD—
I.E., THE CONTRIBUTION THE 
INVESTOR EXPECTS THE QV 
WILL MAKE TO HIS
OVERALL PROFITS
$140 $160 $100 $120 $110
CHART I is designed to illustrate the conditions under which a QV investment made by 




adding a new QV investment to the relevant area of product-space but did not believe that it 
might induce a rival to withdraw an existing QV investment or to change the product-space 
location of an existing or future QV investment would be a predatory QV investment and/or a 
limit QV investment. CHART I has seven rows and five columns.
Each row of CHART I provides a different type of profit information about the QV 
investments described in CHART I’s columns.  The entries in Row (1) indicate the amount of 
operating profits the relevant QV investor perceives ex ante the investment would have to be 
expected to yield on the weighted average to be just normally profitable—i.e., just sufficiently 
profitable to make him willing to make the investment in question.  For simplicity, CHART I 
assumes that that amount is the same ($100) for each of the QV investments it describes.  The 
entries in Row (2) indicate the amount of non-distorting profits the investor expects ex ante his 
investment to generate—the nominal profits he expects it to generate (the difference between the 
revenues he expects ex ante to realize by selling the product the investment will create or by 
operating the distributive outlet the investment will create and the variable28 cost of producing 
the relevant product or running the relevant outlet) plus the non-distorting contribution he 
expects ex ante the investment to make to the profit-yields of his other QV investments by 
reducing the costs he has to incur to establish or operate them and/or increasing the demand that 
buyers have for the products or distributive services they enable him to supply.  Row (3) 
indicates the amount by which the investor expects ex ante that the relevant QV investment 
would reduce his other QV investments’ profit-yields both directly by taking sales from them 
and indirectly by inducing his rivals to alter their conduct if the investment in question would not 
deter any established or potential competitor from making a new QV investment (and would 
neither induce any such rival to relocate its future QV investments nor induce an established 
competitor to withdraw or relocate an existing QV investment).  Row (4) indicates the profits the 
investor would expect ex ante the indicated QV investment to yield if it would not deter a rival 
QV investment (given that it would also not induce a rival to withdraw a QV investment or 
relocate an existing or future QV investment).  The entry in Row (4) of any column equals the 
28 I am implicitly counting the fixed cost of producing the product in question or building the outlet in 
question as part of the QV investment concerned.  Nothing turns on this classification.  If these fixed costs are 
counted as operating costs, operating profits will be lower but so too will be the magnitude of the QV investment in 




entry in Row (2) minus the entry in Row (3) of that column.  If the entry in Row (4) of any 
column equals or exceeds the entry in Row (1) of that column—i.e., if the amount of profits the 
investor expected ex ante that the QV investment in question would yield if it would not deter a 
rival from making an additional QV investment (or induce a rival to withdraw an existing QV 
investment or to relocate an existing or future QV investment) was at least normal, the 
investment would not be a limit investment.  The entries in Row (5) of CHART I indicate the 
amount by which the investor believes ex ante the rival QV investments his investment will deter 
would have reduced his other QV investments’ profit-yields in comparison with the status quo 
ante.  The entries in Row (6) indicate the monopolistic QV-investment incentive (or disincentive 
when they are negative) the investor believes ex ante he has to make the indicated QV 
investment.  The entry in Row (6) of any column equals the entry in Row (5) minus the entry in 
Row (3) of that column: the QV investor will perceive himself ex ante to have a monopolistic 
QV-investment incentive to make a particular QV investment if and to the extent that he believes 
ex ante that the QV investment in question will reduce his other QV investments’ profit-yields in 
distorting ways in comparison to the status quo ante by less than those profit-yields would 
otherwise be reduced by the rival QV investments he believes that his contemplated QV 
investment would or might deter.  The entries in Row (7) of CHART I indicate the total amount 
by which the investor believes ex ante his contemplated QV investment will increase his 
organization’s profits (gross of capital costs).  The entry in Row (7) of any column equals the 
sum of the entries in Rows (2) and (6) of that column—the sum of the non-distorted profits the 
relevant QV investor expects ex ante the investment in question to yield and the distorting 
monopolistic QV-investment incentive he believes ex ante he has to make the investment in 
question.  The entry in Row (7) of any column also equals the sum of the entries in Rows (4) and 
(5) of that column—the sum of the profits the relevant QV investor would expect ex ante the 
investment described to yield if it would not deter a rival from making a QV investment and the 
amount by which the QV investor expects ex ante the investment in question to raise his other 
QV investments’ profit-yields by deterring a rival from making a QV investment.  Presumably, 
the potential investor will make the investment whose profit information is discussed in any 
column if and only if the entry in Row (7) of that column is at least as high as the entry in Row 




profits he anticipates the QV investment’s yielding at least equal the profits he believes ex ante
will constitute a normal rate of return on it.  On my account of the concept of “a predatory QV 
investment,” a QV investment whose profit information is described in a column of CHART I 
will be predatory if and only if the entry in Row (2) of that column is lower than the entry in 
Row (1) of that column but the entry in Row (7) of th at column equals or exceeds the entry in 
Row (1) of the column—i.e., if and only if the investor’s ex ante belief that the relevant QV 
investment would be at least normally profitable was critically affected by his belief that he had a 
monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make it (if and only if he would not have perceived the 
investment to be at least normally profitable but for his perception that it would yield him some 
purely private, distorting profits). 
 CHART I contains five columns.  The information in each column describes a particular 
QV investment, defined by the various profit-expectations the investor who made it or 
contemplated making it had about it.  The first two columns (IA and IB) provide information 
about QV investments that are neither predatory QV investments nor limit QV investments.  The 
second two columns (IIA and IIB) provide information about QV investments that are not 
predatory QV investments but are limit QV investments.  The last column (III) provides 
information about a QV investment that is not only a limit QV investment but also a predatory 
QV investment.
We should now be able to explain why the preceding characterizations of the five QV 
investments described in CHART I are correct.  The QV investments whose profit data are 
presented in Columns IA and IB are not predatory QV investments because the profits the 
relevant investor would have expected them to yield ex ante if he did not think that he had a 
monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make them—the amounts indicated in Row (2)—are at 
least as high as (in fact, exceed) the amount of profits the investor perceived to be normal for the 
QV investments in question—the amounts indicated in Row (1).  The QV investments described 
in Columns IA and IB are non-limit investments because, as a comparison of the entries in Rows 
(4) and (1) of Columns IA and IB respectively reveal, the relevant investor would have expected 
these QV investments to yield at least normal profits ex ante even if he had not believed that they
would or might deter a rival QV investment in the relevant area of product-space ($120>$100).  I 




fact that a QV investor’s ex ante belief that he has a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to 
make the investment in question is not a sufficient condition for its being either a predatory or a 
limit QV investment.  Thus, although the investor whose investment is described in Column IB
believed ex ante he had a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make it, that investment is
neither a predatory nor a limit QV investment.
The QV investments described in Columns IIA and IIB are non-predatory, limit QV 
investments.  They are limit QV investments because, as a comparison of the entries in Rows (4) 
and (1) of Columns IIA and IIB respectively reveal, the investor would not have expected ex 
ante that these investments would yield  at least normal returns had he not expected them to deter 
the investor’s rivals from making an additional QV investment ($80<$100).  Note that the limit-
investment status of the QV investments covered by Columns IIA and IIB does  not depend on 
whether their deterrent effect critically reduces the monopolistic QV-investment disincentive the 
relevant investor believed he faced ex ante—say, from (-$30) to (-$10), as in Column IIA—or 
converted what he perceived ex ante would otherwise have been a monopolistic QV-investment 
disincentive into a monopolistic QV-investment incentive—say, changed the relevant distortion 
from (-$30) to (+$10), as in Column IIB.  A QV investment is a limit investment if and only if 
the investor-ex ante-expected profit-consequences of its deterrent effect—indicated in Row (5)—
raise the actual profits the investor expected the investment to yield ex ante—indicated in Row 
(7) and equal to the entry in Row (4) plus the entry in Row (5)—from below normal to normal or 
above normal—i.e., cause the entry in Row (7) to equal or exceed the entry in Row (1) despite 
the fact that the entry in Row (4) is lower than the entry in Row (1).  On the other hand, the QV 
investments described in Columns IIA and IIB are not predatory QV investments because the 
investor would have expected them ex ante to yield at least normal returns even if the investor 
did not believe ex ante he had a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make them.  In both 
cases, this conclusion is guaranteed by the fact that the profits that the investor would have 
expected them to yield ex ante if the investor did not think he had a monopolistic QV-investment 
incentive to make them—the entry in Row (2), $110—were at least normal—equaled or 
exceeded the entry in Row (1), $100.  I chose to include two examples of non-predatory, limit 
QV investments in CHART I to emphasize the fact that a QV investor’s ex ante belief that he 




sufficient condition for the investment’s being predatory nor a necessary condition for its being a 
limit investment.  I will now discuss each of these points in turn.
As Column IIB manifests, so long as any monopolistic QV-investment incentive the 
investor believed ex ante that he had to make the relevant QV investment is not critical to its 
investor-perceived ex ante profitability—so long as the investor-ex ante-expected legitimate 
profits indicated in Row (2) are at least normal, the QV investment will not be predatory.  Thus, 
although the investor whose ex ante perceptions are recorded in Column IIB believed he had a 
$10 monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make the QV investment described in Column IIB, 
that investment was not predatory because its investor-perceived ex ante profitability was not 
critically affected by this belief: the fact that the investor perceived ex ante that the investment 
would yield undistorted profits ($110) that were at least normal (in this case, exceeded $100) 
implies that the investor would have perceived the investment to be (at least normally) profitable 
ex ante even if the investor believed ex ante that its tendency to deter a rival QV investment 
would do no more than eliminate or adequately reduce the monopolistic QV-investment 
disincentive the relevant investor would otherwise have had to make it (as did the non-predatory,
limit investment described in Column IIA).
The QV investment described in Column IIA illustrates the fact that an investor’s ex ante
belief that he had a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make a particular QV investment is 
not a necessary condition for its being a limit QV investment.  So long as the investor would not 
have ex ante perceived his investment to be at least normally profitable had he not believed it 
would deter a rival QV investment (or induce a rival to withdraw an existing QV investment or 
relocate an existing or future investment), the investment is a limit investment even if the 
investor did not believe ex ante that he had a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make it.  
Thus, although the investor who made the QV investment described in Column IIA did not 
believe ex ante that he had a QV-investment incentive to make it (indeed, believed ex ante that
he faced a QV-investment disincentive of $10 on the investment in question), that investment 
was a limit investment because he would have perceived it to be subnormally profitable ex ante
but for his expectation that it would or might deter an established-rival QV-investment expansion 





The QV investment described in Column III is a predatory, limit investment.  A
comparison of the entries in Rows (4) and (1) of Column III reveal that it is a limit investment 
(since $60 is less than $100).  The entries in Rows (1), (2), (6), and (7) reveal that it is a 
predatory QV investment.  Specifically, this conclusion reflects the facts that the undistorted 
profits the investor expected the investment to yield ex ante—$90, see the entry in Row (2)—
were subnormal—were less than $100, see the entry in Row (1)—while the actual profits the 
investor expected the investment to yield ex ante—$110, see the entry in Row (7)—were 
rendered at least normal by the monopolistic QV-investment incentive the investor believed ex 
ante that he had to make the investment—$20, see the entry in Row (6).  Column III manifests
two things about predatory QV investments.  First, a QV investor’s ex ante belief that he has a 
monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make a particular QV investment is a necessary 
condition for its being predatory.  Second, a QV investment’s being a limit investment is also a 
necessary condition for its being a predatory QV investment: unless the QV investor’s ex ante
belief that the investment would be profitable was critically affected by his ex ante belief that the 
investment might deter a rival QV investment (or might cause a rival to withdraw an existing QV 
investment or relocate an existing or future QV investment), it could not be critically affected by 
his ex ante belief that he would on one or more of these accounts have a monopolistic QV-
investment incentive to make the investment in question.
As I indicated at the beginning of this section, CHART I was developed to illustrate the 
analysis of the character of a QV investment made by an investor who believed ex ante that it 
might deter an established or potential competitor from introducing an additional QV investment 
into the relevant area of product-space.  I would now like to indicate how one would have to alter 
CHART I to make it apply instead to a QV investment made by an investor who believed ex ante
that it might induce an established or potential competitor to alter the location of a QV 
investment it might introduce into the relevant area of product-space.  Formally, the only 
required changes would be in the headings of three rows of CHART I.  The most important 
change is in the heading to Row (5).  In essence, the heading in CHART I’s Row (5) is “the 
amount by which the QV investor in question believed ex ante that the relevant QV investment 
would increase his other QV investments’ profit-yields in comparison with the status quo ante if 




status quo ante by deterring an established or potential competitor from introducing an additional 
QV investment into the relevant area of product-space.”  To cover the situation in which the QV 
investor believed ex ante not that the relevant QV investment would deter a rival QV investment 
but that it would induce the rival to make a different QV investment from the one it would 
otherwise have made, CHART I would have to be altered so that the heading of Row (5) was 
“the amount by which the QV investor in question expected ex ante that the relevant investment 
would increase his other QV investments’ (weighted-average-expected) profit-yields by inducing 
his rivals to alter the product-space location of the new QV investment(s) they would introduce 
into the relevant area of product-space.”  The other two required heading changes are completely 
superficial.  The heading to Row (4) would have to be altered to refer to the weighted-average 
profits the relevant QV investor would have expected ex ante the QV investment in question to 
yield if he did not believe ex ante that it would might induce a rival to change the product-space 
location of any additional QV investment it introduced (or might deter a rival from introducing 
such an investment or induce a rival to withdraw or relocate an existing QV investment).  And 
the last bit of the heading to Row (3) would have to be altered in the same way as the heading to 
Row (4) would have to be altered.
Formally, these changes would not require any alteration in the preceding analysis.  The 
QV investor’s monopolistic QV-investment incentive would still equal the entry in Row (5) 
minus the entry in Row (3); the entry in Row (7) will still equal both the entry in Row (2) plus
the entry in Row (6) and the entry in Row (4) plus the entry in Row (5); at least if one expands 
the concept of a limit QV investment even more contestably to cover situations in which the 
investor’s ex ante perception that his QV investment is at least normally profitable is critically 
affected by his ex ante belief that it may induce a rival to alter the location of a future QV 
investment, the QV investment will still be a limit QV investment (in this extended sense) if and 
only if the entry in Row (4) is lower than the entry in Row (1) while the entry in Row (7) equals 
or exceeds the entry in Row (1); and the QV investment will still be a predatory QV investment 
if and only if the entry in Row (2) is lower than the entry in Row (1) while the entry in Row (7) 
equals or exceeds the entry in Row (1).
Of course, if both CHART I and this revised variant are filled in with numbers that reflect 




would appear in various cells of the altered CHART I would tend to be quite different from their 
CHART I counterparts, and the percentage of the investments that the revised chart contains that 
would be predatory would be much lower than the counterpart percentage of CHART I.  The 
crucial difference is that, ceteris paribus, the entries in Row (5) of the revised CHART I will be 
much lower than the entries in the Row (5) of CHART I: a QV investment that deters a rival QV 
investment will increase the profit-yields of the investor’s other QV investments far more on this 
account than a QV investment that induces a rival to relocate its additional QV investment will 
increase on that account the profit-yields of the other QV investments of the investor whose QV 
investment is to be characterized; indeed, since QV investors will generally tend to locate their 
additional QV investments far away in product-space from their existing projects, a QV 
investor’s new QV investment may tend to decrease his other QV investments’ profit-yields to 
the extent that it induces one or more of his rivals to change the location of their new QV 
investments since the investor’s new QV investment will tend to make it less profitable for them 
to locate near it than otherwise would be the case and therefore relatively more profitable for 
them to locate their new project closer to the investor’s other QV investments than would 
otherwise be the case.  I should add that when a QV investor (or a cost-reducing investor) 
believes ex ante that his investment will reduce his other QV investments’ profit-yields by 
inducing a rival to relocate an existing QV investment or to locate a future QV investment closer 
in product-space to his other QV investments, that fact will affect his ex ante perceived 
monopolistic investment incentive.  Obviously, the fact that the entry in Row (5) of the revised 
CHART I will be lower than its CHART I counterpart and may even tend to be negative implies 
that the entries in Row (6) of the revised CHART I will be less positive than their CHART I 
counterparts (indeed, may even tend to be negative): a QV investor who believes ex ante that his 
investment will induce his rival to relocate a future QV investment is far less likely to believe he 
has a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make the investment in question than is a QV 
investor who believes ex ante that his investment will deter a rival from making a QV investment 
altogether.  Moreover, when members of these two sets of investors believe that they have a 
monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make the investment in question, members of the 
former set will tend to believe that they have a larger incentive than members of the latter set will 




investments of QV investors who believe ex ante that the investments in question might induce a 
rival to relocate a future QV investment will be less likely to be predatory than the investments 
of QV investors who believe that the investments in question might deter a rival from adding a 
QV investment to the relevant area of product-space—i.e., imply that QV investors who believe 
ex ante that their QV investment may induce an established or potential competitor to alter the 
location of a future QV investment are less likely to have their ex ante perception that their 
investment would be at least normally profitable be critically affected by an ex ante perception 
that they had a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make it.
Three additional points should be made at this juncture.  First, the immediately-preceding 
analysis will also apply mutatis mutandis to any QV investment made by a QV investor who 
believes ex ante it may induce an established rival to alter the product-space location of an 
existing QV investment of a rival rather than a new QV investment of a rival.
Second, with appropriate changes in the relevant row-headings, the preceding analysis 
will also apply to a QV investment made by a QV investor who believes ex ante that it may alter 
two or more of the various types of rival decisions just analyzed—the decision to add a new QV 
investment to the relevant area of product-space, to change the location of such a new QV 
investment, or to change the location of an existing QV investment.  (For these purposes, it does 
not matter whether the investor believes ex ante that the investment to be characterized will 
create a possibility that two or more of these types of decisions will actually be altered ex post or 
creates some possibility that any one of these three types of rival decisions may be altered.)
Third, I want to repeat an old refrain.  Regardless of the type of rival QV-investment 
decision a QV investor believes ex ante the investment to be characterized may alter, my 
conclusion that a QV investment should be deemed predatory if and only if the investor’s ex ante
conclusion that it is at least normally profitable is critically affected by the monopolistic QV-
investment incentive he believes ex ante he has to make it implies that a QV investment will be 
predatory and Sherman-Act violative if and only if (1) it should be expected to be allocatively 
inefficient in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy (its expected undistorted profits were 
subnormal) and (2) it was made despite this fact because the investor believed ex ante that its 




contribute to its allocative product—reasons that suggest if anything that its execution will be 
less rather than more allocatively efficient.
2. Some Examples of Non-Predatory/Non-Limit QV Investments, Non-Predatory/Limit QV 
Investments, and Predatory/Limit QV Investments Made by an Investor Who Believed Ex 
Ante That They Might Induce an Established Rival to Withdraw an Existing QV 
Investment
In my judgment, although most QV investments are made by investors who believe ex 
ante that their execution may deter their rivals from making an additional QV investment in the 
relevant area of product-space and many QV investments are made by investors who believe ex 
ante that their execution may induce their rivals to change the product-space location of their 
existing or future QV investments, few QV investments are made by investors who believe ex 
ante that their execution may induce an established rival to withdraw an existing QV investment.
Nevertheless, I will focus separately on the determinants of the character of QV investments 
made by investors who think they may lead a rival to withdraw an existing QV investment.  
Primarily, I do so because, as I have already suggested and Section D of Part III discusses, the 
leading economics article on predatory (QV) investments focuses exclusively on QV investments 
made by investors who believe ex ante that they may or will lead an established rival to 
withdraw an existing QV investment.
Fortunately, no real additional work has to be done to illustrate the circumstances in 
which QV investments made in these circumstances will be predatory QV investments or will be 
“limit QV investments” if one defines this latter expression problematically to cover inter alia
any QV investment made by an investor who would not have perceived it ex ante to be at least 
normally profitable had he not believed that it might lead an established rival to withdraw an 
existing, rival QV investment.  In particular, CHART I can be adapted to cover this type of 
investment through an alteration that is analogous to the alteration that made it apply to any QV 
investment made by an investor who believed ex ante that it might induce a rival to alter the 
product-space location of a new or existing QV investment.  In particular, to make CHART I 
cover the kind of investment with which this subpart is concerned, one need only change the 
headings of Rows (3), (4), and (5).  In particular, the heading of Row (3) must be altered to “the 




other QV investments in one or more distorting ways both during the period in which it co-
existed with the rival investment whose withdrawal it would induce and after the relevant rival 
investment was withdrawn”; the heading in Row (4) must be altered to “the profits the investor 
would expect the relevant QV investment to yield ex ante if he did not believe that it would 
cause a rival QV investment to be withdrawn (or induce a rival to change any other QV-
investment decisions)”; and the heading in Row (5) must be altered to “the weighted-average-
expected amount the investor believed ex ante that the existing QV investment the investment in 
question would cause to be withdrawn originally reduced the profit-yields of the investor’s other 
QV investments both directly and by altering his remaining rivals’ decisions plus the weighted-
average-expected amount the investor believed ex ante that his de facto substitution of the 
investment in question for the rival investment it might cause to be withdrawn would increase his 
other QV investments’ profit-yields by reducing the extent to which his remaining rivals 
competed against his remaining QV investments because (rightly or wrongly) they perceived his 
investment to be predatory.”
None of these alterations would change either the relationship between the entries in the 
various rows of the chart nor chart-related conditions under which the QV investments it 
describes would be predatory QV investments and/or limit QV investments if the latter 
expression is defined expansively to cover the type of situation on which this subpart is focusing.  
Thus, the entry in Row (4) would still equal the entry in Row (2) minus the entry in Row (3); the 
entry in Row (6) would still equal the entry in Row (5) minus the entry in Row (3); the entry in 
row (7) would still equal the entry in Row (2) plus the entry in Row (6) or the entry in Row (4) 
plus the entry in Row (5); the QV investment described in any column will still be a limit QV 
investment if and only if the entry in Row (4) is lower than the entry in Row (1) but the entry in 
Row (7) is higher than the entry in Row (1); and the QV investment described in any column will
still be a predatory QV investment if and only if the entry in Row (2) is lower than the entry in 
Row (1) while the entry in Row (7) equals or exceeds the entry in Row (1).  Column IIA of the 
revised CHART I described earlier in this subpart manifests the conclusion that a QV investor 
need not believe ex ante that he has a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make a QV 
investment that he believes might induce the withdrawal of a rival QV investment for the QV 




that a QV investor’s ex ante belief that he has a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make a 
QV investment that he believes might induce the withdrawal of a rival QV investment is not a 
sufficient condition for the QV investment’s being a limit QV investment.  Columns IB, IIB, and 
III manifest the conclusion that the investor’s ex ante perception that he had a monopolistic QV-
investment incentive to make a QV investment that he believed ex ante might induce the 
withdrawal of a rival QV investment is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for such an 
investment’s being predatory.  And, taken as a whole, the appropriately revised version of 
CHART I also manifests the conclusion that—when the relevant QV investment is believed by 
its maker to have some potential to induce the withdrawal of a rival QV investment—its being a 
limit QV investment is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for its being a predatory QV 
investment.
So much for the formalities.  I should not close this section without pointing out that the 
numbers that appear in Rows (5) and (6) of the chart designed to cover QV investments that their 
makers believe ex ante might lead to the withdrawal of an existing, rival QV investment are not 
likely to be systematically critically different from their CHART I counterparts—i.e., from the 
entries in a chart that covers QV investments believed by their makers to have at least some 
potential to deter rivals from making additional QV investments.  QV investors who think that 
their investment may induce the withdrawal of an existing, rival QV investment are as likely to 
believe ex ante that they have monopolistic QV-investment incentives as are QV investors who 
believe ex ante that their investment may deter a rival from making a new QV investment, and 
the size of the monopolistic QV-investment incentives that QV investors who believe ex ante
that their investment may induce the withdrawal of an existing, rival QV investment is likely to 
be as large as the monopolistic investment incentives that QV investors who believe that their 
investment may deter a rival from making a new QV investment are likely to believe ex ante that 
they have.  I would therefore expect that the percentage of rival-QV-investment-withdrawal-
inducing QV investments that are predatory will be at least as high as the percentage of rival-
new-QV-investment-deterring QV investments that are predatory.





The heading has a question-mark inside the parentheses because the courts’ examination 
of the Sherman-Act legality of various QV investments has often not focused on whether the 
investments under review could properly be deemed predatory.  Nevertheless, it seems fair to say 
that both of the two canonical opinions in federal antitrust cases that involve QV investments 
seem to have reached incorrect conclusions about the circumstances in which QV investments 
violate the Sherman Act or cause the investor’s position to be Sherman-Act violative and that the 
more recent federal opinion that addresses this issue is also highly unsatisfactory.
I have already referred to the first of the two canonical federal QV-investment cases, 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.  As I indicated, in that case, Judge Learned Hand 
argued that the fact that Alcoa’s QV investments in capacity deterred others from constructing 
aluminum-refining capacity made Alcoa’s allegedly monopolistic position illegal under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act.29  I hasten to admit that Hand’s opinion does not explicitly find that Alcoa’s 
capacity investments were themselves illegal (predatory) or, indeed, were even “not honestly 
industrial,” whatever that might mean.  However, Hand did say that Alcoa’s decisions to build 
new capacity were “effective exclusions,”30 and, in antitrust jargon, the statement that a choice is 
“exclusionary” does imply that it is illegal.  Certainly, many antitrust scholars and lawyers 
suspect that Hand believed that Alcoa’s capacity-expansions were themselves illegal.  True, 
Hand might have cited these Alcoa decisions simply to show that Alcoa’s high market share was 
“not inevitable,” but one could make the same point by citing Alcoa’s refusal to divest itself of 
existing capacity.  Unless Alcoa’s decisions to expand were predatory, how could one justify a 
finding that they rather than its decision not to divest itself of existing plant rendered its position 
illegal under the Sherman Act?  In any event, nothing in the Alcoa opinion suggests that Alcoa’s 
capacity-expansions were even non-predatory limit investments, much less predatory limit 
investments.  I have no doubt that Alcoa’s capacity expansions did deter rivals from building 
aluminum-refining plants and were made more profitable by that fact.  Indeed, this would be true 
even if Alcoa had no monopolistic QV-investment incentive to expand its capacity.  But nothing 
29 See 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).  For other cases that seem to have raised similar issues, see 
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) and DuPont (Titanium) v. Federal Trade Commission, 





in the opinion suggests that (1) Alcoa would not have found its expansions profitable even if they 
had not deterred any rival QV investment, (2) Alcoa actually had a monopolistic QV-investment 
incentive to make the QV investments in question (though I suspect it did), or (3) any 
monopolistic QV-investment incentives Alcoa had to make the relevant investments critically 
affected Alcoa’s ex ante perception that they were at least normally profitable (which I doubt 
they did).  To the extent that Hand’s opinion in Alcoa can be read to assert the proposition that 
any QV investment that deters a rival QV investment is predatory and Sherman-Act violative on 
that account, the opinion is wrong.  To the extent that Hand’s opinion in Alcoa can be read to 
assert that Alcoa’s capacity-expansions were predatory in the correct sense of “predatory,” that 
assertion is unfounded and (in my judgment) highly unlikely to be true.
The second canonical federal antitrust case on QV investments is Union Leader,31 a case 
involving a decision by a newspaper to publish a second paper in a particular town that had its 
own local journal in circumstances in which the profitability of the relevant investment depended 
on its driving the entered town’s original newspaper out of business.  The court assumed that in 
such fight-to-the-death cases the defendant’s conduct will violate § 2’s prohibition of 
monopolizing or attempting to monopolize if and only if it conducted the relevant fight to the 
death unfairly—i.e., by making competitive moves other than the QV investment itself that gave 
it a competitive (survival) advantage unrelated to its relative allocative efficiency.32  This 
position ignores the possibility that the QV investment may itself be predatory—that the 
investor’s ex ante belief in the investment’s normal profitability was critically affected by his
perception that the substitution of the investment in question for his exited rival’s investment
would increase the profit-yield of the investor’s other QV investments without increasing the 
allocative efficiency of his operations (for example, because the investor’s new QV investment
was further away in product-space from his other QV investments than was the rival QV 
investment whose exit his QV investment would induce).
31 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).  I should add that Union Leader has 
spawned a large number of related “unfair competition” decisions.
32 For a discussion of such unfair competition cases, see Richard S. Markovits, OLIGOPOLISTIC AND 




The third, more recent case that involves the possible predatory character of a QV 
investment is Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM.33  In this case, the court was asked to make 
its assessment of the predatory character of IBM’s pricing and investment decisions depend inter 
alia on the impact of the relevant choices on the profits yielded by IBM’s other products—i.e., 
on the so-called “impact costs” of these decisions.  According to the court, when the decision to 
be evaluated was the introduction of a new product, the relevant “impact costs” were “the 
reduction in anticipated future profits of an existing product line caused by the introduction of a 
new product line.”34  If this calculation is understood to encompass the possibility that a seller’s 
new investment might increase the profit-yields of its old QV investments and to involve 
consideration of the way in which the new product-line would affect the investor’s old product-
lines’ profit-yields not only directly but also by affecting various rivals’ relevant pricing and 
investment decisions, this proposal would have correctly articulated an essential part of the 
correct approach to assessing the predatory character of the decision to introduce the new 
product-line.  Unfortunately, the court decided to reject this proposal—in particular, to exclude 
evidence on any determinant of such “impact costs” as a matter of law—justifying its decision 
on the grounds35 that
(1) the consideration of such evidence “could be a disincentive to research and 
innovation,”36
(2) such evidence is speculative,37
(3) impact costs are not reflected in conventional profit and loss statements,38 and
33 459 F. Supp. 626 (1978).
34 Id. at 631.
35 Id.
36 In fact, it would deter R&D that might lead to predatory QV investments but encourage the predator’s 
rivals to do R&D.
37 In fact, such evidence is no more speculative than the other kinds of evidence the courts admit in such 
cases.
38 This accounting practice is totally irrelevant to whether courts should consider these costs, given the fact 




(4) consideration of such evidence would lead courts to require businesses to 
maximize their profits, which would cause them to ignore their social 
responsibilities.39
In short, this more recent opinion rejected a proposed approach to the predatory QV-investment 
issue that at least was a step in the right direction.
C. Ordover and Willig’s Position on Predatory QV Investments
In a highly-regarded article,40 Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig argued that innovative 
QV investments that induce a rival to withdraw an established product should be deemed 
predatory and Sherman-Act violative if and only if their profitability was critically affected by 
the rival-product exit they induced.  In my judgment, this conclusion would be wrong even if it 
were recouched as a subjective, probabilistic test of predation and legality: the fact that the 
maker of an innovative QV investment would not have perceived it to be ex ante profitable had 
he not believed that the investment might induce a rival to withdraw an existing product (the fact 
that the QV investment in question was a limit investment in the extended sense of that 
expression) does not make the investment predatory because it does not imply that the relevant 
profitability prediction was inflated in my sense, much less that it was ceteris paribus critically 
inflated in my sense of that expression.  An innovative QV investment will be predatory if and 
only if its investor-perceived ex ante profitability was critically inflated by the possibility that it
might increase the profit-yields of the investor’s other QV investments by substituting the 
investor’s investment for the rival investment it would drive out.
39 Five objections can be made to this contention.  First, the consideration of such costs would actually 
militate against businesses’ increasing their profits by engaging in predation.  Second, the prohibition of businesses’ 
sacrificing short-run profits to obtain profits in the long run by deterring entries or expansions does not prohibit 
them from sacrificing profits in the public interest.  Third, there is no reason to believe that predators will spend 
their ill-gotten gains in the public interest.  Fourth, even if they do, the tendency of the exclusion of such evidence to 
increase the expenditures of this kind that the predators make would be more or less offset by the predation’s 
tendency to decrease the expenditures of this kind that would otherwise have been made by the predator’s victims 
had they profited from making the QV investments the predator’s predatory QV investments deterred.  Fifth, the 
impact of an antitrust ruling on the extent to which its addressees make charitable contributions or other types of 
non-profitable expenditures in the public interest is irrelevant to its correctness in any event.
40 Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 




Viewed as an analysis of predatory QV investments, Ordover and Willig’s article is also 
deficient in three other respects.  First, they give no reason for focusing exclusively on 
innovative QV investments and, in fact, the proper definition of a predatory QV investment does 
not depend on whether or not it is technologically or commercially innovative.  Second, Ordover 
and Willig give no reason for their decision to focus exclusively on QV investments that drive 
existing QV investments out, and, I suspect, the number of predatory QV investments that drive 
an existing QV investment out is far smaller than the number of predatory QV investments that 
deter the investors’ established and potential competitors from adding a QV investment to the 
relevant area of product-space.  If Ordover and Willig extended their analysis to cover the latter 
type of QV investments, their conclusion would be that any such investment that is a limit 
investment (that would not have been made had the investor not believed that it would deter a 
rival QV investment) is predatory.  I have already explained why this conclusion is wrong.  
Third, and admittedly tangentially, Ordover and Willig are simply wrong when they assert that 
the QV investments they deem predatory will not be “worth their cost”—by which I assume they 
mean “will be allocatively inefficient.”41  On the applicable otherwise-Pareto-perfect 
assumption, the facts that they think make a QV investment predatory do not even imply that the 
profitability of the investments in questions will be inflated, much less critically inflated.  
Indeed, although, by definition, the profitability of any predatory QV investment that is properly 
so-called will be ceteris paribus critically inflated by the monopolistic QV-investment incentive 
the investor believed he had to make it, that fact implies only that such investments would be 
allocatively inefficient in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world.  In our actual, highly-Pareto-
imperfect world in which a relevant investor may underestimate the profits his investment would 
yield if the investor did not have a monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make it, buyers of 
the product the relevant QV investment created may underestimate its value to them or derive 
buyer surplus from purchasing it, the cost of creating and using a QV investment may be inflated 
by the fact that the resources that would be used for these purposes would be withdrawn from the 
creation of an alternative QV investment that would have created a product that would have been 
sold by a non-discriminator who faced a downward-sloping demand curve, and the creation and 
use of the relevant QV investment and the consumption of the good its use produces may 




generate external benefits or reduce external costs, some QV investments that are properly 
deemed predatory may be “worth their cost” in the sense of increasing allocative efficiency.
D. The Structure of Predatory QV-Investment Litigation
As Ordover and Willig pointed out, “even genuine innovations—new products that in 
some ways are superior to existing products in the eyes of both engineers and consumers —are in 
some circumstances anticompetitive”42—i.e., predatory.  However, as the preceding discussion
demonstrates, the predatory character of a QV investment depends on whether the decision to 
make it was critically affected by the investor’s ex ante belief that he had a  monopolistic QV-
investment incentive to make it—i.e., by the investor’s ex ante perception that the investment 
would increase the profits yielded by his other QV investments in ways that did not contribute to 
his organization’s allocative efficiency by a sufficient amount to make normally or 
supernormally profitable an investment that he would otherwise have perceived to be less than 
normally profitable.  In a few cases, a private plaintiff or the State may be able to establish a 
prima facie case that a firm’s QV investment was predatory without itself generating cost and 
revenue data that establish the requisite probability that it would not have been profitable but for 
the monopolistic QV-investment incentive the investor had to make it by putting into evidence 
defendant memoranda, audio or audio-visual recordings of defendant statements of anti-
competitive intent or guilt, and/or eye-witness testimony indicating that the defendant intended 
to or actually did execute a predatory QV investment.  As Ordover and Willig note: “the 
defendant’s investment planning process may be the most useful source of data concerning the 
firm’s expectations.  Decisions to commit substantial funds to R&D projects [or QV investments 
in general] are likely to be supported by internal analyses of prospective costs and financial 
benefits.”43  Since internal financial analysts have a stake in giving accurate, honest reports and 
company files are not always purged of tell-tale evidence (and even when they are, original 
memos appear surprisingly often in an orderly manager’s personal files or the hard-drive of the 
company’s computer system), internal memoranda and e-mails may demonstrate that the alleged 
predator’s QV-investment decision was critically affected by his hope and expectation that it 
42 Id.




would or might alter one or more rivals’ QV-investment decisions in ways that would increase 
the profit-yields of his other QV investments.  Of course, the courts will have to be sensitive to 
the possibility that an actual predator may include misleading reports in his files to justify his 
behavior.  To prevent itself from being misled in this way and to handle cases in which the 
available internal memos are not conclusive (and testimony by corporate whistle-blowers or 
repentant or fearful, deal-making wrongdoers is not available or decisive), the courts will have to 
rely on independently-collected evidence of the actual profit -performance of the QV investment 
under suspicion.
More specifically, when defendant memos and whistle-blowing testimony are not 
decisive, I would recommend that predatory-QV-investment trials be structured in the following 
way.  In the first stage, the private plaintiff or the State should be required to submit evidence 
demonstrating that the amount of nominal profits the QV investment under suspicion yielded did 
not constitute a normal rate of return on the investment in question.  Then, in the second stage, 
the defendant should be given the opportunity to exonerate himself by establishing the requisite 
probability that (1) he did not in fact have any monopolistic QV-investment incentives to make 
the suspected investment, (2) the nominal operating profits were in fact normal or would be 
normal over the course of the QV investment’s life, (3) the sum of (a) the nominal operating 
profits the QV investment would yield over its life plus (b) the non-distorting contribution it 
made to the profits yielded by the QV investor’s other QV investments constituted a normal rate 
of return on the QV investment in question, or (4) although the QV investment would not yield a 
normal rate of return in legitimate ways, it was mistaken or tortious (motivated by spite) rather 
than predatory.  I will now comment briefly on each of those four possibilities.
Unfortunately, I suspect that defendants will usually not be able to exonerate themselves 
by demonstrating that they had no monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make the QV 
investment under suspicion.  Although sellers sometimes make QV investments that do not deter 
or eliminate rival QV investments, I assume that virtually all QV investments that are attacked as 
being predatory will have had such an effect.  And although it is conceivable that some such 
investments would not yield monopolistic QV-investment-incentive advantages, it is relatively 
unlikely that this would be the case.  Moreover, it will be extremely difficult for the defendant to 




proof, the defendant would have to describe the characteristics of the product or outlet whose 
introduction his QV investment forestalled, to explain why it would not have been best-placed or 
second-placed to serve many of his old products’ or outlets’ customers, and why its presence 
would not have encouraged other firms to compete more aggressively than they did after he
made his investment.  I suspect, therefore, that even innocent defendants will find it difficult to 
exonerate themselves in this way.
The second way in which a defendant might try to exonerate himself would be to argue 
that the nominal operating profits his QV investment would yield over its lifetime would in fact 
be normal even if it did not produce allocatively-valuable cost-related and/or demand-related 
joint economies that increased the profit-yield of his other QV investments.  Two claims are 
likely to figure prominently in this connection.  First, the defendant might argue that the QV 
investment’s future returns were expected to be higher than its current or recent past returns—
that demand for the product or outlet in question was expected to rise either because consumers 
were in the process of learning about its advantages or because overall demand for the products 
in the relevant area of product-space was expected to rise during its lifetime and/or that the 
company had adopted policies that had reduced the QV investment’s short-run yield to a 
misleadingly low level (had charged prices that were lower than the prices that would maximize 
the profits the investment would yield in the short run in order to promote the product or had 
engaged in other promotional activities that are expensed in the short run but expected to bear 
fruit in the long run).  Second, the defendant might try to combat the other side’s operating-profit 
claim by arguing that the prosecutor or plaintiff had overestimated the normal rate of return for 
an investment of the kind in question.  In many cases, defendants may be able to exonerate 
themselves on the basis of these arguments alone.
However, when the defendant cannot establish his QV investment’s non-predatory 
character by showing that it would yield a normal amount of nominal operating profits on its 
own over its useful life, he may still be able to exonerate himself with a third argument—viz., by 
showing that the investment would yield a normal amount of legitimate profits if one considered 
its non-distorting effect on the profits yielded by the other QV investments he owns.  I have 
already explained that a QV investment’s overall legitimate profits will exceed its nominal 




investments by improving his other products’ or outlets’ images, by giving him the advantages of 
a full line, or by generating joint-cost economies.  I suspect that in most cases the defendant will 
have to submit engineering, financial, and/or market-research reports or put final consumers or
distributors on the stand to establish these claims: evidence proving that the profits the QV 
investor realized on his other QV investments increased after he made the investment under 
suspicion will not be very persuasive both because these products’ profits could increase for 
many other reasons than the ones he was alleging and, more particularly, because the relevant 
profits may have increased because of the very facts the other side alleged gave him a 
monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make the investment in question.
Fourth, and finally, if the defendant cannot establish that his QV investment was 
expected to or actually did generate a normal amount of profits independent of any monopolistic 
QV-investment incentives he had to make it, the defendant could still exonerate himself from 
any wrongdoing by showing that his QV-investment decision had been a mistake and could 
exonerate itself under the antitrust laws by showing that he had undertaken the investment “out 
of pure spite” and had not reduced competition as a result.  The defendant could try to establish 
that his QV investment had been a mistake in two different ways—indirectly by showing that he
did not have any or any significant monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make it or directly 
by delineating the error that he had made and providing evidence in support of his claim that he
had made the error in question.  I have already indicated how difficult it will be for a defendant 
to establish that he had no monopolistic QV-investment incentive to make the QV investment 
under suspicion.  Moreover, even if the defendant can establish that he had made an error and 
that the operative monopolistic QV-investment incentives were too low to make his investment 
privately profitable overall, he might not be able to succeed on this basis, for even in this case his
investment may have been predatory—i.e., the monopolistic QV-investment-incentives he
thought he had ex ante may have critically affected his estimate of the investment’s 
attractiveness, given his misperception of the profits the suspected investment would yield in 
other ways.  Still, there will be situations in which a defendant can fully exonerate himself by 
showing that he mistakenly believed that the suspected QV investment would yield normal 
profits for legitimate reasons over and above any monopolistic QV-investment incentives that 




from antitrust liability by showing that he had consciously made a QV investment he knew 
would not be profitable or anti-competitive out of spite—in order to injure a particular business 
rival for reasons unrelated to any monetary rewards he could reap by doing so.  A defendant who 
wanted to rely on this type of pure-tort admission would probably need to submit evidence 
demonstrating that (1) he hated the party whose QV investment the suspected investment 
deterred or eliminated and (2) he did not have a significant monopolistic QV-investment 
incentive to make the suspected investment because he had reason to believe that the target either 
would not exit or, if it did exit, would be quickly replaced by an equally-competitive rival.
Obviously, it will not be easy for an alleged predatory QV investor to establish any of the 
defenses that would overcome the prima facie case that a private plaintiff or the State could 
make out by proving that the nominal book profits yielded by the allegedly-predatory QV 
investment were subnormal.  However, this conclusion does not imply that plaintiffs or the State 
will find it easy to win predatory-QV-investment cases when they cannot rely on defendant-
memoranda, notes of meetings, audio or audio-visual recordings, and/or eyewitness testimony to 
establish the defendant’s predatory intent or admissions of guilt.  In such situations, a private 
plaintiff or the State will usually find it extremely difficult to calculate the nominal supernormal 
profits the suspected QV investment yielded.  Even if, as I am proposing, one does not require 
the plaintiff to measure the synergistic effects of the allegedly-predatory QV investment, 
insuperable obstacles will often be posed by the difficult task of measuring the magnitude of the 
allegedly-predatory QV investment and of determining the normal rate of return on the 
investment in question.
IV. Predatory Marginal-Cost-Reducing Investments and Predatory Accident-and-Pollution-
Cost-Reducing PPR
Investments in plant-modernization, investments in new-plant construction, investments 
in PPR that is designed to discover production processes whose use will reduce some cost other 
than the amount of accident and pollution costs the production of the relevant product generates, 
and investments in PPR that is designed to discover a less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone 
production process may all be non-predatory.  More specifically, investments in plant-
modernization and investments in the construction of new plants that are intended to replace old 




expected ex ante that the sum of (1) the cost savings these investments would enable them to 
achieve by reducing the variable cost they had to incur on their pre-investment outputs and (2) 
any additional profits the investments would enable them to secure (even if they did not induce 
the withdrawal of any established QV investment, deter the introduction of any new QV 
investment, or induce the relocation of any existing or future rival QV investment) by rendering 
it profitable for the investor to make additional sales by reducing the investor’s marginal costs 
would constitute  at least a normal rate of return on the investment in question (which in the case 
of new-capacity construction would be reduced by the post-investment value of the facility that 
could be retired).  Investments in both types of PPR described above will be non-predatory if 
made by investors who will use any resulting discoveries exclusively themselves if the amount of 
profits they expected ex ante the relevant project to generate (1) by reducing the total cost the 
discoverer had to incur to produce his pre-discovery output of the product to whose production 
the discovery relates and (2) by enabling the discoverer to increase his profits by expanding his
output by decreasing his marginal costs under the conditions described above would constitute at 
least a normal return on the PPR investment in question.  Finally, investments in both types of 
PPR described above will be non-predatory if made by investors who will license others to use 
their discovery as well as use it themselves if the amount of profits they expect ex ante that the 
project will generate for them in the above two ways and by enabling them to collect license fees 
will constitute at least a normal rate of return on the PPR investment in question.
However, although no-one has yet recognized this possibility, all four of these types of 
non-QV investments may also be predatory.  In particular, all four of these types of non-QV,
cost-reducing investments will be predatory if and only if the relevant investor’s ex ante
perception that they would yield him at least normal profits was critically affected by his belief 
that he had a monopolistic investment incentive to make them (that they would increase the 
profit-yields of his QV-investment projects by causing an established product-rival to withdraw 
one or more existing QV investments, by deterring an established or potential competitor from 
introducing a new QV investment into the area of product-space in which the product whose 
production would be affected by the non-QV investment in question is located, and/or by 
inducing an established or potential competitor to change the product-space location of an 




conditions under which the above types of non-QV investments will be predatory and discusses





A. The Conditions Under Which Various Non-QV Investments Directed at Decreasing the 
Investor’s Marginal Costs or Increasing His Rivals’ Average Total and/or Marginal Costs 
Will Be Predatory
1. Investments in Plant-Modernization, in New-Plant Construction, and in PPR That Is Not 
Designed to Discover Less-Accident-and-Pollution-Cost-Prone Production Processes
Investments of the various types listed in the heading will be predatory if and only if the 
investor’s ex ante belief that the investment would yield at least normal profits was critically 
affected by his belief that it might increase his profits by driving a rival out, deterring a rival 
from introducing a new QV investment that would increase total QV investment in the relevant 
area of product-space, or inducing a rival to change the location of an existing or future QV 
investment by lowering the investor’s marginal costs and thereby critically reducing the profits 
the existing or future rival QV investment that would be withdrawn, deterred, or moved would 
generate—i.e., by making the investor privately-best-placed to supply buyers the relevant rival 
QV investment was or would otherwise have been best-placed to supply (by eliminating the 
profits the relevant rival QV investment originally generated or would otherwise have generated 
on sales to these buyers) and reducing the competitive advantage the relevant rival QV 
investment had or would have in relation to buyers it continued to be or would still be best-
placed to supply after the non-QV investment in question was executed (thereby reducing the 
profits the relevant rival QV investment would yield on sales to the buyers in question).  Since 
the extra profits the non-QV investment would enable its maker to realize on his QV-investment 
projects by causing his rivals to withdraw, not make, or alter the location of their QV 
investments would have no allocative-efficiency gain counterpart in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect 
world, their existence implies that the profitability of the relevant non-QV investment will be 
inflated on their account—that they give the relevant investor a monopolistic cost-reducing-
investment incentive to make the non-QV investment in question.  Of course, although the non-
QV investor’s ex ante perception that he had a monopolistic cost-reducing-investment incentive 
to make the investment in question is a necessary condition for its being predatory, it is not a 
sufficient condition: for the relevant investment to be predatory, the investor’s ex ante belief that 
he had a monopolistic investment incentive to make it must have critically affected his ex ante




Although an investor could conceivably find it profitable for predatory reasons to make a 
marginal-cost-reducing investment of any of the three kinds on which we are currently focusing 
despite the fact that the investment in question increased the average total cost the investor had to 
incur to produce his pre-investment output, I suspect that most predatory investments in plant-
modernization, new-plant construction, and PPR that is not directed at reducing accident-and-
pollution costs will reduce the investor’s relevant average total costs at the same time that they 
reduce his marginal costs.  Obviously, predatory investments of these kinds that increase the 
investor’s relevant average total costs will be far easier to recognize as predatory than (the far 
greater number of) predatory investments that reduce the investor’s average total costs at the 
same time that they reduce the investor’s marginal costs.44
2. PPR Into Less-Accident-and-Pollution-Cost-Prone Production Processes
The second set of non-QV, cost-reducing investments that can be predatory will be 
predatory under different conditions from those in which the investments discussed in the 
preceding section are predatory.  In particular, investment in PPR that is designed to discover 
less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone production processes that are otherwise more expensive 
(that reduce average total cost only if that concept is defined to include the accident and pollution 
costs generated) will be predatory if and only if
(1) the research is designed to discover
(A) a less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone production process that is 
otherwise-more-expensive and
(B) whose non-use once it was discovered would be negligent (since its use 
would reduce traditional private accident and pollution costs by more than 
it would increase other private variable costs of production),
(2) the investor in the relevant PPR produces the product to whose production the 
discovery relates,
44 The text has ignored a second set of circumstances in which the types of non-QV investments on which this 
section is focusing will be predatory—namely, when the investor’s ex ante perception that the investment will yield 
at least a normal rate of return is critically affected by his belief that it might prevent the rivals whose profits it 
reduces from competing with the investor in production-process research.  The non-QV investments in question 
might generate this effect by depriving its victims of profits they would have used to finance the relevant research 
(when outside capital is more expensive or impossible to secure), by causing it to exit and thereby depriving it of the 
production experience that would increase the cost-effectiveness of its PPR, and/or by causing it to exit and thereby 
depriving it of contacts with its product-rivals that might increase its ability to market its PPR discoveries to them.  I 




(3) the tort liability of both the investor and his product-rivals for the production-
process decisions they make when producing the product to whose production the 
relevant PPR project relates is governed by negligence,
(4) ex ante the investor would not have perceived the relevant PPR project to be 
profitable if he assumed that he would not price the right to use any related 
discovery predatorily (that he would charge those license fees that would 
maximize his profits if one ignored their impact on his rivals’ QV-investment 
decisions) but for his belief that the research might increase the profits his QV
investments generate by driving a product-rival out, by deterring an established or 
potential competitor from introducing a new QV investment that would raise total 
QV investment in the relevant area of product-space, or by inducing an 
established or potential competitor to change the location of an existing or future 
QV investment—i.e., if he assumed that he would not price the use of his 
discovery predatorily, the investor’s ex ante weighted-average-expected 
prediction of the license fees the PPR would enable him to secure plus (minus) 
any additional profits the discovery might enable him to realize because its use 
would raise his marginal costs by less (more) than it would raise his rivals’ 
marginal costs minus any loss the discovery would impose on him by raising his 
and his rivals’ marginal costs if it would not affect his rivals’ QV-investment 
decisions was lower than the investor’s ex ante estimate of the amount of profits 
that would be normal on the PPR investment in question.
As I have already indicated, someone who was considering making an investment in PPR 
that might lead to the discovery of an otherwise-more-expensive but accident-and-pollution-cost-
reducing production process whose non-use would be negligent might expect that the investment 
in question would increase his QV investments’ profit-yields by inducing his rivals to alter their 
QV-investment decisions even if he would not price the right to use the relevant discovery 
predatorily.  This conclusion reflects the fact that the discovery would put the investor’s rivals in 
a position in which they must choose among (1) continuing to operate in the same way but 
paying damages equal to the accident and pollution losses they could have prevented by shifting 
to the discovered production process, losses for which they would not have been liable pre-
discovery, (2) avoiding the additional liability by paying a license fee to use and actually using
the otherwise-more-expensive production process, (3) shifting to an otherwise-less- profitable but 
less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone location at which their rejection of the discovered process 
would not be negligent, (4) shifting to the production of an otherwise-less-profitable product-




produced through that process (for example, because its production was sufficiently less-
accident-and-pollution-cost-prone for the discovered process to make critically smaller 
difference in the amount of such costs its production generated), or (5) shutting down altogether.
If the PPR induced the fifth of these responses, it would increase the profit-yields of the 
PPR investor’s QV investments in both the short run and the long run if one assumes, either (A) 
that if the investor did nothing to prevent this result the withdrawn rival QV investment would 
not be immediately replaced by an alternative rival QV investment that would reduce those 
yields by as much as the withdrawn QV investment reduced them or (B) that the investor could 
profit by forestalling such rival replacement-investments by making a limit investment.
If the investment in PPR induced the third or fourth of these responses, it would increase 
the profit-yields of the PPR investor’s QV investments in the short run (roughly speaking) if the 
new product-space locations were farther from his QV investment than were the old ones and 
might do so even more in the long run if the associated reduction in his rivals’ profits compared 
to the status quo ante made it less than normally profitable for one or more rivals to continue 
operating in the long run.
If the PPR induced the second of these responses, it would tend to increase the profit-
yield of the PPR investor’s QV investments in the short run to the extent that the non-predatory 
license fee had a per-use-charge component or to the extent that (license-fee payments aside) the 
extra cost of using the discovered process was higher for the discoverer’s rivals than for the 
discoverer and would tend to increase the profit-yield of the PPR investor’s QV investments by 
even more in the long run to the extent that the loss the discovery imposed on his rivals made it 
profitable for them to exit in the long run.
The PPR would be unlikely to induce the first of these responses, given that in an 
otherwise-Pareto-perfect world this response would be unprofitable for the rival who made it.  
However, if a rival did respond in this way to the relevant discovery, the investment that led to it 
would tend to increase the profit-yields of the QV investments of the PPR investor in the short 
run by raising his rivals’ marginal costs by more than his use of his discovery raised his own 




more by reducing the relevant rivals’ operating profits sufficiently to cause them to exit in the 
long run.45
B. The Practicability of Winning Suits Directed at Predatory Investments in Plant-
Modernization, New-Plant Construction, and PPR of Different Sorts
As I have already indicated, to my knowledge, no-one has written about the possibility 
that investments in plant modernization, new-plant construction, and PPR may be predatory.  
Admittedly, however, this fact may reflect the relevant scholars’ perception that predation cases 
directed at such investments would be impracticable rather than their failure to realize that 
predatory acts of this kind are sometimes committed.  In any event, it may be useful to close this 
Article by discussing the practicability of winning cases against the kinds of non-QV, cost-
reducing investments on which Part IVA focused.
Although I fully acknowledge the difficulty of proving that a non-QV, cost-reducing 
investment was predatory, the task is significantly more practicable than one might suppose. In 
some cases, a private plaintiff or the State may be able to prove that a defendant has made a 
predatory marginal-cost-reducing investment or a predatory investment in accident-and-
pollution-cost-reducing production-process research from written documents or oral testimony 
that establishes the defendant’s predatory intent.  For example, in some cases, a private plaintiff 
or the State may be able to obtain memos to its researchers or sales personnel that explicitly state 
the defendant’s intention to drive one or more of its rivals out.  In other cases, the plaintiff or the 
State may be able to rely on
(1) head-office memos directing its researchers to discover production processes that 
will reduce marginal cost even if their use will raise average total cost,
(2) engineering-department memos indicating that a planned or completed new plant 
or planned or completed plant-remodeling would or did increase average total 
cost at the same time that it would or did reduce marginal cost or would or did 
reduce average operating total cost by too little to have been profitable even given
45 PPR investments that are predatory because this second set of conditions is satisfied could be said to be 
predatory because they “raise rivals’ costs.”  For a general discussion of the various ways in which business actors 
may act predatorily by making choices whose expected profitability depends on their raising rivals’ costs, see 
Thomas Krattenmaker and Stephen Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over 
Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209 (1986).  I should add that investments in the kind of PPR on which this section is focusing 
may also be predatory because its investor perceived ex ante profitability was critically affected by its tendency to 




the short-run gains any resulting reduction in marginal costs would or did enable 
the company to realize if it would not induce a rival to exit or deter a rival from 
making a new QV investment.
(3) reports from the defendant’s research division about the probability that anyone 
else would discover a less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone method of producing 
the defendant’s product,
(4) defendant ex ante financial analyses of the expected profitability of a suspect PPR 
project that was designed to discover a less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone 
production process that incorporated the findings of the report just described and 
concluded that the project would not be normally profitable if it did not affect 
rival QV-investment decisions—that the difference between the license fees the 
project should be expected on the weighted average to enable the defendant to 
collect and the profits the discovery would cost him by putting him and his rivals 
in a position in which they must use the discovered, otherwise-more-expensive 
production process to escape tort liability would not constitute a normal rate of 
return on the investment if there were no prospect of the discovery’s inducing a 
rival to exit, deterring a rival from making an additional QV investment, or 
inducing a rival to change the location of an existing or future QV investment to 
one that was less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone and that happened to be less 
competitive with the defendant’s QV investments, and
(5) ex post financial analyses of the actual outcome of a completed PPR project that 
led to the discovery of a “safer” production process revealing that the net non-
inflating profits it yielded did not constitute a normal rate of return on the 
investment in question.
Although one might think that such memos would be destroyed prior to or early on in any 
litigative process, companies often have one or more executives or employees who do not follow 
shredding instructions for any one of a number of reasons: because they fear that such evidence-
destruction is illegal, because they disapprove of their company’s predatory conduct or fear the 
legal repercussions of being found to have participated in such conduct and want to distance 
themselves from it, because they like to keep complete files for the sake of doing so, or because 
they are disorganized or careless.  Moreover, to the extent that the relevant memos were typed 
onto computers and circulated through e-mail, they may be recoverable because it is far more 
difficult to remove traces of them from a computer system than many seem to suppose.
Moreover, even if such written evidence is not available, a private plaintiff or the State 
may be able to substantiate its claim through oral testimony—from innocent, whistle-blowing 




treatment from the prosecution by confessing and cooperating, by customers of the predator who 
have been told of the company’s plan by indiscrete sales personnel (perhaps after the customers
expressed surprise at the price concessions they were offered), or by the targets of the predation,
who may have been told of the company’s plans in the course of negotiations to buy them out at 
distress prices.  Of course, the evidentiary value of whistle-blower testimony will be reduced if 
the whistle-blower is a disgruntled employee or former (fired) employee, the testimony of 
participants in the conduct in question who are trying to secure a better deal is open to question
on that account, and the testimony of the buyers and rivals of the alleged predator who are trying 
to secure damages from him is undermined by the financial incentive they have to lie.  Still, in 
many circumstances, such oral testimony will be at least somewhat persuasive.
Even if no such evidence can be obtained from others, the private plaintiff or the State 
may be able to generate the necessary evidence itself by commissioning
(1) accounting studies of the cost of the non-QV investments alleged to be predatory 
and economic studies of the normal rate of return on these investments,
(2) engineering studies of the effect of a discovered non-accident-and-pollution-cost-
reducing production process, a plant remodeling, or new-plant construction on the 
defendant’s average total and marginal cost,
(3) market research on the effect of any reduction in the defendant’s marginal costs 
on the sum of the alleged target’s competitive advantages,
(4) engineering or accounting studies of the additional cost to the discoverer and his 
alleged target of using the discovered less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone 
production process,
(5) accounting studies of the supernormal profits the alleged target realized by 
producing the product whose withdrawal the defendant allegedly targeted prior to 
the defendant’s execution of the allegedly predatory non-QV investment, and
(6) business studies of
(A) the speed with which the target’s withdrawn QV investment would be 
replaced by another investment made by a rival of the defendant if the 
defendant did not replace that investment himself,
(B) the difference between the amount by which any rival replacement-
investment would reduce the defendant’s returns and the amount by which 





(C) the ability of the defendant to profit by replacing the alleged target’s 
withdrawn QV investment with a new QV investment of his own.
Admittedly, if the foregoing types of evidence do establish that the investment alleged to 
be predatory would not have yielded a normal rate of return had it not induced one or more rivals 
of the investor to withdraw a QV investment, deter a rival from making a new QV investment, or 
induce a rival to relocate an existing or future QV investment, the defendant will still be able to 
exonerate himself by demonstrating that ex ante he mistakenly believed that the relevant 
investment’s normal profitability did not depend on its eliciting such rival responses or, perhaps, 
that it was motivated by spite rather than by the desire to profit by reducing the competition he
faced (a fact that would not be legally relevant if the defendant would have engaged in the 
relevant conduct for predatory reasons even if he had not been motivated by spite).
I certainly do not claim that it will be easy or cheap for a private plaintiff or the State to 
prove that a non-QV investment of any type on which Part IV has focused was predatory.  But I 
think that in some instances it will be possible and practicable to pursue predation suits against 
companies that have made investments of these types.  Certainly, I do not think that the difficulty 
of winning such suits can justify the literature’s failure to notice that investments of these kinds 
may be predatory.
CONCLUSION
This Article has established the following eight conclusions.  First, if the Sherman 
Act’s test of legality is properly articulated and the concept of predatory conduct is properly 
defined, predation will emerge as one type of conduct that violates the Sherman Act.  Second, an 
investment that increases the quality or variety of the investor’s products or distributive outlets or 
increases the average speed with which the investor can deliver its product throughout a 
fluctuating-demand cycle (what I call a QV investment) may be predatory—in particular, will be 
predatory if and only if the ex ante belief of the investor who made it that the investment would 
be at least normally profitable was critically affected by his ex ante perception that he had a 
“monopolistic QV-investment incentive” to make it (was critically affected by his perception that 
it would increase the profits yielded by his other QV investments in ways that did not increase its 




investments will be predatory—in effect, have found some such investments predatory for 
reasons that do not establish their predatory character (simply because they have deterred rivals 
from making QV investments) and have ignored the possibility that QV investments that can be 
profitable only if they cause an established QV investment to be withdrawn may be predatory in 
themselves, independent of the way in which the associated “fight-to-the-death” is conducted.  
Fourth, the economists who have tried to define predatory QV investments (A) have offered a 
definition that focuses on only one of the situations in which QV investments may be made—
viz., the situation in which the investment in question will induce the withdrawal of a rival QV 
investment, (B) have misdefined the circumstances in which in those situations QV investments 
will be predatory—viz., have claimed that a QV investment made in such a situation will be 
predatory if and only if its profitability was critically affected by its causing a rival of the 
investor to withdraw a QV investment, and (C) have offered a definition of QV investment in the 
situation they addressed whose extension to situations in which the QV investment might deter 
an established rival QV-investment expansion or a new entry conflates predatory investments 
properly so-called with the core case of what might be labeled “limit investments” (investments 
made by investors who would not have perceived them to be [at least normally] profitable but for 
their belief that the investments would deter a rival QV-investment expansion or entry).  Fifth, 
non-QV, marginal-cost-reducing investments in plant-modernization, new-plant construction, 
and production-process research (PPR) that is not designed to discover a less-accident-and-
pollution-cost-prone production processes will sometime be predatory and sometimes not be 
predatory—in particular, will be predatory if and only if the investor’s ex ante perception that the 
investment in question would be at least normally profitable was critically affected by his 
perception that he might have a monopolistic cost-reducing-investment incentive to make it (that 
it might increase his profits by [A] reducing his marginal costs, relatedly [B] reducing the 
competitive advantages and profit-yields of one or more existing or future QV investments of a 
rival, and relatedly [C] inducing an established rival to withdraw or relocate an existing QV 
investment, deterring an actual or potential competitor from making a new QV investment that 
would increase total QV investment in the relevant area of product-space, and/or inducing an 
actual or potential competitor to relocate a future QV investment within the relevant area of 




pollution-cost-prone production processes may also be predatory or not predatory—in particular, 
will be predatory if and only if the investor’s ex ante perception that they will yield at least 
normal profits was critically affected by his belief that he had a monopolistic investment 
incentive to make it (that it might increase his QV investments’ profit-yields by increasing a
rival’s costs or reducing a rival’s profits by placing the rival in a position in which to escape 
additional tort liability it must use a discovered otherwise-more-expensive but accident-and-
pollution-cost-reducing production process, shift to an otherwise-less- profitable but less-
accident-and-pollution-cost-prone location, shift to the production of an otherwise-less-profitable 
but less-accident-and-pollution-cost-prone product-variant, or shut down altogether)—i.e., put 
one or more rivals in a position in which it becomes profitable for them to exit, to reject making 
a QV investment that would add to total QV investment in the relevant area of product-space in 
this way, and/or to move an existing or future QV investment to a less-accident-and-pollution-
cost-prone location in the relevant area of product-space that happens to be farther away from the 
PPR investor’s QV investments. Seventh, no-one has yet recognized the possibility that the 
types of non-QV, cost-reducing investments described in the preceding two sentences may be 
predatory.  Eighth, although predation cases directed at QV investments and non-QV, cost-
reducing investments of the types discussed will be difficult to win, there is some reason to 
believe that they will not always be impracticable.
In the process of executing the analyses that generate these conclusions, this Article 
develops and employs some concepts and distinctions that are not standard in the literature—
inter alia, the concept of a monopolistic investment incentives, which plays a critical role in the 
definition of all types of predatory investments, and the distinctions among QV investments, 
investments in PPR of two different sorts, and non-PPR, cost-reducing investments of various 
types, which structure the analysis of the various sets of conditions in which investments will be 
predatory.  This Article is valuable not only because it improves our understanding of predatory 
investments but also because it validates these concepts and distinctions by demonstrating their 
usefulness.
